{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-07-04T17:21:44+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-53360","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-53360","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-53360.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53360","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53360"},"summary":{"title":"KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use\n\nAs per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area\nto reside in the GHCB's shared buffer.  Note, things like Page State Change\n(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length\nwhen making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by\nthe size of the shared buffer.\n\nFailure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a\nmalicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap\nlayout information.\n\nsetup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),\nwhere exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields\na 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer\nholds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only\nentries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.\n\nsnp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)\nbut NOT against the actual buffer size:\n\n      idx_end = hdr->end_entry;\n\n      if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) {   // checks 253, not buffer\n          snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);\n          return 1;\n      }\n\n      for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {\n          entry_start = entries[idx];           // OOB when idx >= 2\n\nThe guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]\nwhich are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:\n\n  - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)\n  - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes\n    cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)\n  - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent\n    memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)\n\nThe guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range\n(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly\nhit different slab positions.\n\nBy exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:\n    - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)\n    - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)\n    - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs\n\nE.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module\nproduces 73 KASAN reports:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890\n    Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890\n    Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX\n     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32\n    The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of\n     allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)\n\n  Breakdown:\n    62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)\n     7 slab-use-after-free\n     4 use-after-free\n\nAll credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!\n\n[sean: write changelog]","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-07-04 12:17:01","updated_at":"2026-07-04 12:17:01"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53360","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53360","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951 bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951 c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951 b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951 db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.10","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.10 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.93 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.35 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.0.12 7.0.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc","status":"affected","version":"4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae","status":"affected","version":"4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846","status":"affected","version":"4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7","status":"affected","version":"4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.10"},{"lessThan":"6.10","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.93","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.35","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.0.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.0.12","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.93","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.35","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.0.12","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1","versionStartIncluding":"6.10","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use\n\nAs per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area\nto reside in the GHCB's shared buffer.  Note, things like Page State Change\n(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length\nwhen making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by\nthe size of the shared buffer.\n\nFailure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a\nmalicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap\nlayout information.\n\nsetup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),\nwhere exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields\na 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer\nholds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only\nentries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.\n\nsnp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)\nbut NOT against the actual buffer size:\n\n      idx_end = hdr->end_entry;\n\n      if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) {   // checks 253, not buffer\n          snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);\n          return 1;\n      }\n\n      for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {\n          entry_start = entries[idx];           // OOB when idx >= 2\n\nThe guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]\nwhich are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:\n\n  - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)\n  - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes\n    cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)\n  - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent\n    memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)\n\nThe guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range\n(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly\nhit different slab positions.\n\nBy exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:\n    - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)\n    - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)\n    - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs\n\nE.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module\nproduces 73 KASAN reports:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890\n    Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890\n    Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX\n     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32\n    The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of\n     allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)\n\n  Breakdown:\n    62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)\n     7 slab-use-after-free\n     4 use-after-free\n\nAll credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!\n\n[sean: write changelog]"}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-04T11:53:58.657Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7"}],"title":"KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-53360","datePublished":"2026-07-04T11:53:58.657Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-09T07:44:35.400Z","dateUpdated":"2026-07-04T11:53:58.657Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-07-04 12:17:01","lastModifiedDate":"2026-07-04 12:17:01","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"53360","Ordinal":"1","Title":"KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use","CVE":"CVE-2026-53360","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"53360","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use\n\nAs per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area\nto reside in the GHCB's shared buffer.  Note, things like Page State Change\n(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length\nwhen making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by\nthe size of the shared buffer.\n\nFailure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a\nmalicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap\nlayout information.\n\nsetup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),\nwhere exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields\na 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer\nholds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only\nentries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.\n\nsnp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)\nbut NOT against the actual buffer size:\n\n      idx_end = hdr->end_entry;\n\n      if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) {   // checks 253, not buffer\n          snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);\n          return 1;\n      }\n\n      for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {\n          entry_start = entries[idx];           // OOB when idx >= 2\n\nThe guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]\nwhich are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:\n\n  - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)\n  - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes\n    cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)\n  - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent\n    memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)\n\nThe guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range\n(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly\nhit different slab positions.\n\nBy exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:\n    - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)\n    - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)\n    - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs\n\nE.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module\nproduces 73 KASAN reports:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890\n    Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890\n    Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX\n     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32\n    The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of\n     allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)\n\n  Breakdown:\n    62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)\n     7 slab-use-after-free\n     4 use-after-free\n\nAll credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!\n\n[sean: write changelog]","Type":"Description","Title":"KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use"}]}}}