{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-06T00:42:17+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-55524","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-55524","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-55524.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55524","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55524"},"summary":{"title":"PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"GitHub_M","published_at":"2026-08-05 20:17:10","updated_at":"2026-08-05 20:17:10"},"problem_types":["CWE-367","CWE-918","CWE-367 CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition","CWE-918 CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj","name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55524","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55524","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"MervinPraison","product":"PraisonAI","version":"affected < 1.6.58","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"product":"PraisonAI","vendor":"MervinPraison","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"< 1.6.58"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-367","description":"CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-918","description":"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M"},"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj","discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","cveId":"CVE-2026-55524","datePublished":"2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-16T22:44:22.284Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-05 20:17:10","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-05 20:17:10","problem_types":["CWE-367","CWE-918","CWE-367 CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition","CWE-918 CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":2.2,"impactScore":4.7}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"55524","Ordinal":"1","Title":"PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS","CVE":"CVE-2026-55524","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"55524","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.","Type":"Description","Title":"PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS"}]}}}