{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-30T20:20:22+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-57079","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-57079","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-57079.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-57079","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57079"},"summary":{"title":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata","description":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.\n\nNet::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.\n\nBecause the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"CPANSec","published_at":"2026-06-30 12:16:25","updated_at":"2026-06-30 14:16:28"},"problem_types":["CWE-22","CWE-22 CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"ADP","type":"DECLARED","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","version":"3.1"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","type":"Secondary","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr","name":"https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-57079","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57079","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"SANKO","product":"Net::BitTorrent","version":"affected 2.0.1 custom","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"There is no fixed release. Validate metadata file path components on the peer and magnet ingest path as the .torrent-file path already does (reject components equal to '', '.', or '..' or containing '/' or '\\'), and confirm each resolved path stays within the download directory before writing.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","version":"3.1"}},{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-57079","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-06-30T13:52:00.535187Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-06-30T13:52:04.135Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://cpan.org/modules","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"Net-BitTorrent","product":"Net::BitTorrent","programFiles":["lib/Net/BitTorrent/Torrent.pm","lib/Net/BitTorrent/Storage.pm","lib/Net/BitTorrent/Storage/File.pm"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"Net::BitTorrent::Torrent::_on_metadata_received"},{"name":"Net::BitTorrent::Storage::add_file"},{"name":"Net::BitTorrent::Storage::_parse_file_tree"}],"repo":"https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm","vendor":"SANKO","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"2.0.1","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"custom"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.\n\nNet::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.\n\nBecause the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host."}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-22","description":"CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-06-30T11:04:32.211Z","orgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","shortName":"CPANSec"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr"}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","value":"There is no fixed release. Validate metadata file path components on the peer and magnet ingest path as the .torrent-file path already does (reject components equal to '', '.', or '..' or containing '/' or '\\'), and confirm each resolved path stays within the download directory before writing."}],"x_generator":{"engine":"cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","assignerShortName":"CPANSec","cveId":"CVE-2026-57079","datePublished":"2026-06-30T11:04:32.211Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-23T18:20:33.513Z","dateUpdated":"2026-06-30T13:52:04.135Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-06-30 12:16:25","lastModifiedDate":"2026-06-30 14:16:28","problem_types":["CWE-22","CWE-22 CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":1.4}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-06-30T13:52:00.535187Z","id":"CVE-2026-57079","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"57079","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outs","CVE":"CVE-2026-57079","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"57079","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.\n\nNet::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.\n\nBecause the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.","Type":"Description","Title":"Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outs"}]}}}