{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-05T11:49:58+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-57114","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-57114","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-57114.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-57114","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57114"},"summary":{"title":"PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. 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