{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-07-20T14:43:34+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-64114","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-64114","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-64114.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-64114","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64114"},"summary":{"title":"ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5\n\nraw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header\nfits within the message length:\n\n    iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;\n    err = -EINVAL;\n    if (iphlen > length)\n        goto error_free;\n\n    if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {\n        /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */\n    }\n\nIt does not, however, reject ihl < 5.  For such a packet the\n\"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" branch is skipped, leaving the\ncrafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to\n__ip_local_out() and onward.  Downstream consumers that read\niph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in\nparticular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4\nand passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)\nresult to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to\nSIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.\n\nAn IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:\n\"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in\n32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header\nis 5.\").  The kernel should not be willing to inject such a\npacket into its own output path.\n\nReject \"iphlen < sizeof(*iph)\" alongside the existing\n\"iphlen > length\" check.  This matches the principle that locally\nconstructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same\nbasic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.\n\nOnce this lands, the \"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" wrapper around\nthe fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the\npatch minimal and backport-friendly.  A follow-up can unwrap it.\n\nNote that commit 86f4c90a1c5c (\"ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket\nmessage is big enough to hold an IP header\") ensures the message\nbuffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain\nthe self-reported iph->ihl.\n\nReachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with\nCAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net\nnamespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y.  The reproduced AH\ncrash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing\nroute; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state\nand policy in its netns.  Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the\ntrigger uses a real netdev.\n\nReproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with\nmemcpy_orig at the crash site.  Same shape reproduces inside a\nrootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock\ndistro kernel.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-07-19 16:17:52","updated_at":"2026-07-19 16:17:52"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15ee","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15ee","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0b","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0b","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-64114","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64114","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15ee git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0b git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 2.6.12","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 2.6.12 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 5.10.258 5.10.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 5.15.209 5.15.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.1.175 6.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.6.142 6.6.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.92 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.34 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.0.11 7.0.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["net/ipv4/raw.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15ee","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0b","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc","status":"affected","version":"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["net/ipv4/raw.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"2.6.12"},{"lessThan":"2.6.12","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"5.10.*","status":"unaffected","version":"5.10.258","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"5.15.*","status":"unaffected","version":"5.15.209","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.1.175","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.6.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.6.142","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.92","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.34","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.0.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.0.11","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"5.10.258","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"5.15.209","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.1.175","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.6.142","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.92","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.34","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.0.11","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.12","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5\n\nraw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header\nfits within the message length:\n\n    iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;\n    err = -EINVAL;\n    if (iphlen > length)\n        goto error_free;\n\n    if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {\n        /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */\n    }\n\nIt does not, however, reject ihl < 5.  For such a packet the\n\"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" branch is skipped, leaving the\ncrafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to\n__ip_local_out() and onward.  Downstream consumers that read\niph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in\nparticular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4\nand passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)\nresult to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to\nSIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.\n\nAn IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:\n\"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in\n32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header\nis 5.\").  The kernel should not be willing to inject such a\npacket into its own output path.\n\nReject \"iphlen < sizeof(*iph)\" alongside the existing\n\"iphlen > length\" check.  This matches the principle that locally\nconstructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same\nbasic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.\n\nOnce this lands, the \"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" wrapper around\nthe fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the\npatch minimal and backport-friendly.  A follow-up can unwrap it.\n\nNote that commit 86f4c90a1c5c (\"ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket\nmessage is big enough to hold an IP header\") ensures the message\nbuffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain\nthe self-reported iph->ihl.\n\nReachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with\nCAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net\nnamespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y.  The reproduced AH\ncrash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing\nroute; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state\nand policy in its netns.  Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the\ntrigger uses a real netdev.\n\nReproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with\nmemcpy_orig at the crash site.  Same shape reproduces inside a\nrootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock\ndistro kernel."}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-19T15:40:14.854Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1065b9efa4126df559b03a849c139ecfae92cd25"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc20dbd48c26e743f7e0845020c11ed2ce8b15ee"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a564f737ec54d63e8ee221d3ff396d07586d464"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5411fa4944ed99af3d9d1de750ea8169b6dac9"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145e9afa5b905229b4788bb72c3255f5a5f77508"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7725cd3b471740fd23d25ed1da722c671fb2a5d3"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe0be67de296176e7243c76e3d9f02f6ae9ff0b"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/915fab69823a14c170dbaa3b41978768e0fe62fc"}],"title":"ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-64114","datePublished":"2026-07-19T15:40:14.854Z","dateReserved":"2026-07-19T07:54:57.035Z","dateUpdated":"2026-07-19T15:40:14.854Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-07-19 16:17:52","lastModifiedDate":"2026-07-19 16:17:52","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"64114","Ordinal":"1","Title":"ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5","CVE":"CVE-2026-64114","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"64114","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5\n\nraw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header\nfits within the message length:\n\n    iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;\n    err = -EINVAL;\n    if (iphlen > length)\n        goto error_free;\n\n    if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {\n        /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */\n    }\n\nIt does not, however, reject ihl < 5.  For such a packet the\n\"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" branch is skipped, leaving the\ncrafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to\n__ip_local_out() and onward.  Downstream consumers that read\niph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in\nparticular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4\nand passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)\nresult to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to\nSIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.\n\nAn IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:\n\"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in\n32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header\nis 5.\").  The kernel should not be willing to inject such a\npacket into its own output path.\n\nReject \"iphlen < sizeof(*iph)\" alongside the existing\n\"iphlen > length\" check.  This matches the principle that locally\nconstructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same\nbasic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.\n\nOnce this lands, the \"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))\" wrapper around\nthe fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the\npatch minimal and backport-friendly.  A follow-up can unwrap it.\n\nNote that commit 86f4c90a1c5c (\"ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket\nmessage is big enough to hold an IP header\") ensures the message\nbuffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain\nthe self-reported iph->ihl.\n\nReachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with\nCAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net\nnamespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y.  The reproduced AH\ncrash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing\nroute; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state\nand policy in its netns.  Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the\ntrigger uses a real netdev.\n\nReproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with\nmemcpy_orig at the crash site.  Same shape reproduces inside a\nrootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock\ndistro kernel.","Type":"Description","Title":"ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5"}]}}}