{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-13T16:58:40+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-68160","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-68160","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-68160.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68160","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68160"},"summary":{"title":"ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n    ...\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\n            ...\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n                                       false, &realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /\nri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,\nguarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-08-10 13:20:02","updated_at":"2026-08-10 13:20:02"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68160","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68160","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea 9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea 71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 2.6.34","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 2.6.34 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.6.148 6.6.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.101 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.42 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1.6 7.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2-rc5 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["fs/ceph/caps.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295","status":"affected","version":"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1","status":"affected","version":"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb","status":"affected","version":"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a","status":"affected","version":"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02","status":"affected","version":"a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["fs/ceph/caps.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"2.6.34"},{"lessThan":"2.6.34","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.6.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.6.148","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.101","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.42","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1.6","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2-rc5","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.6.148","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.34","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.101","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.34","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.42","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.34","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1.6","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.34","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2-rc5","versionStartIncluding":"2.6.34","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n    ...\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\n            ...\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n                                       false, &realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /\nri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,\nguarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath."}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-10T11:59:26.741Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02"}],"title":"ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-68160","datePublished":"2026-08-10T11:59:26.741Z","dateReserved":"2026-07-30T09:28:09.371Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-10T11:59:26.741Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-10 13:20:02","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-10 13:20:02","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"68160","Ordinal":"1","Title":"ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handl","CVE":"CVE-2026-68160","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"68160","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n    snaptrace     = h + 1;\n    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);\n    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n    ...\n    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n        if (snaptrace_len) {\n            ...\n            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n                                       false, &realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /\nri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper.  The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,\nguarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space.  This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath.","Type":"Description","Title":"ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handl"}]}}}