{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-06T03:08:47+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-70375","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-70375","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-70375.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-70375","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70375"},"summary":{"title":"HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Field","description":"HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"TuranSec","published_at":"2026-08-05 07:16:39","updated_at":"2026-08-05 16:17:01"},"problem_types":["CWE-78","CWE-78 CWE-78 OS Command Injection"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","type":"Secondary","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms","name":"https://github.com/HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms","refsource":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://cve.turansec.uz/advisories/TRN-B571F773","name":"https://cve.turansec.uz/advisories/TRN-B571F773","refsource":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-70375","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70375","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"HashBrownCMS","product":"hashbrown-cms","version":"affected 1.4.6 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"Alijonov Alisher","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"70375","cve":"CVE-2026-70375","epss":"0.005940000","percentile":"0.450720000","score_date":"2026-08-05","updated_at":"2026-08-06 00:00:31"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-70375","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-08-05T15:01:05.661783Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T15:03:00.979Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unknown","product":"hashbrown-cms","programFiles":["src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js"],"repo":"https://github.com/HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms","vendor":"HashBrownCMS","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"1.4.6","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Alijonov Alisher"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-78","description":"CWE-78 OS Command Injection","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T12:53:14.963Z","orgId":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","shortName":"TuranSec"},"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/HashBrownCMS/hashbrown-cms"},{"url":"https://cve.turansec.uz/advisories/TRN-B571F773"}],"title":"HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Field"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","assignerShortName":"TuranSec","cveId":"CVE-2026-70375","datePublished":"2026-08-05T05:46:26.004Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-04T07:13:07.993Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T15:03:00.979Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-05 07:16:39","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-05 16:17:01","problem_types":["CWE-78","CWE-78 CWE-78 OS Command Injection"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2.8,"impactScore":5.9}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-05T15:01:05.661783Z","id":"CVE-2026-70375","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"70375","Ordinal":"1","Title":"HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Fiel","CVE":"CVE-2026-70375","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"70375","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.","Type":"Description","Title":"HashBrown CMS: OS Command Injection via Git Deployer Branch Fiel"}]}}}