{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-06T04:31:47+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-71272","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-71272","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-71272.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71272","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71272"},"summary":{"title":"Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()","description":"Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. 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Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":8.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-367","description":"CWE-367","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T12:52:35.512Z","orgId":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","shortName":"TuranSec"},"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/usememos/memos"},{"url":"https://github.com/usememos/memos/blob/main/internal/webhook/webhook.go"}],"title":"Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","assignerShortName":"TuranSec","cveId":"CVE-2026-71272","datePublished":"2026-08-05T12:26:19.395Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-05T12:23:34.967Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T15:54:41.075Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-05 13:24:51","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-05 16:17:06","problem_types":["CWE-367","CWE-367 CWE-367"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","baseScore":8.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":3.1,"impactScore":4.7}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-05T15:54:35.331224Z","id":"CVE-2026-71272","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"71272","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()","CVE":"CVE-2026-71272","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"71272","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection.","Type":"Description","Title":"Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()"}]}}}