{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-06T00:42:00+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-71289","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-71289","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-71289.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71289","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71289"},"summary":{"title":"NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via Exposed AMP Manager REST API","description":"The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. \"${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp\") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to \"no\" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"TuranSec","published_at":"2026-08-05 13:24:53","updated_at":"2026-08-05 16:17:08"},"problem_types":["CWE-306","CWE-306 CWE-306"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","type":"Secondary","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools","name":"https://github.com/JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools","refsource":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/anms","name":"https://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/anms","refsource":"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71289","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71289","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"NASA-AMMOS","product":"anms","version":"affected * custom","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-71289","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-08-05T15:49:18.706853Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T15:49:24.325Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"anms","programFiles":["docker-compose.yml"],"vendor":"NASA-AMMOS","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"custom"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. \"${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp\") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to \"no\" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. 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The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to \"no\" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.","Type":"Description","Title":"NASA-AMMOS ANMS / JHUAPL dtnma-tools Unauthenticated Remote Comm"}]}}}