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Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. 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Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. 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Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. 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