CTI-Transmute contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by insufficient neutralization of Vue template expression delimiters in server-rendered user-controlled data.
An unauthenticated attacker can create a public conversion whose name or description contains a malicious Vue expression using the application's configured [[ ... ]] delimiters. User profile names may provide an additional injection vector. Although Jinja HTML escaping is applied, the resulting value is subsequently included in a DOM region compiled by Vue.
Vue interprets the attacker-controlled value as a template expression rather than ordinary text. By accessing the JavaScript Function constructor from within the expression, an attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the security context of the CTI-Transmute origin. The application's nonce-based Content Security Policy does not prevent exploitation because the Vue runtime compiler requires the unsafe-eval policy exception.
The malicious payload is stored by the application and executed whenever another user opens an affected page, such as the public conversion detail page. The victim may be a normal user or an administrator. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to:
A demonstrated payload can use [].constructor.constructor(...) to obtain the JavaScript Function constructor and execute arbitrary code. The regression tests also show that a short first-stage payload could retrieve an uncapped conversion description and evaluate a larger second-stage payload.
The patch addresses the vulnerability by registering a global Jinja finalize hook that inserts a zero-width Unicode word joiner inside every Vue delimiter found in server-rendered values. This prevents Vue from recognizing the values as template expressions while preserving their visible representation.