{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-03T21:14:05+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-71886","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-71886","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-71886.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71886","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71886"},"summary":{"title":"OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority","description":"In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"bcorg","published_at":"2026-10-03 09:17:04","updated_at":"2026-10-03 09:17:04"},"problem_types":["CWE-285","CWE-863","CWE-863 CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization","CWE-285 CWE-285 Improper Authorization"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","type":"Secondary","score":"8.2","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"AMBER"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.2","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","data":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"AMBER","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb","name":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb","refsource":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886","name":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886","refsource":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71886","name":"CVE 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OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.</p>"}],"value":"In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"AMBER","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-863","description":"CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization","lang":"en","type":"CWE"},{"cweId":"CWE-285","description":"CWE-285 Improper Authorization","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z","orgId":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","shortName":"bcorg"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority","x_generator":{"engine":"bc release-notes template"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","assignerShortName":"bcorg","cveId":"CVE-2026-71886","datePublished":"2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-08T00:06:06.982Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-03 09:17:04","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-03 09:17:04","problem_types":["CWE-285","CWE-863","CWE-863 CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization","CWE-285 CWE-285 Improper Authorization"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"AMBER"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"71886","Ordinal":"1","Title":"OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certificati","CVE":"CVE-2026-71886","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"71886","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.","Type":"Description","Title":"OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certificati"}]}}}