{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-21T23:12:36+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-72340","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-72340","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-72340.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72340","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72340"},"summary":{"title":"net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block\n\nThe VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked\nindependently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are\nbacked by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and\ncommand registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL\nregister and moves data through the shared cache registers.\n\nAccessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The\nper-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a\ndifferent lock.\n\nThe locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of\nthe vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs\ndecodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache\nread) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule\nwrite to another Super VCAP instance.\n\nBesides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache\nbetween the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer\ncommits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.\n\nIntroduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule\nlock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the\nper-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that\nserializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new\nadmin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the\ncontrol lock instead of a per-instance one.\n\nNo path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a\nsingle mutex cannot self-deadlock.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-08-15 06:22:07","updated_at":"2026-08-17 06:18:37"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72340","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72340","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.2","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.6.145 6.6.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.97 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.40 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1.5 7.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"72340","cve":"CVE-2026-72340","epss":"0.001750000","percentile":"0.073120000","score_date":"2026-08-17","updated_at":"2026-08-18 00:11:47"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_vcap_impl.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_vcap_impl.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.h","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs_kunit.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_kunit.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_private.h"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1","status":"affected","version":"71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc","status":"affected","version":"71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041","status":"affected","version":"71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b","status":"affected","version":"71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9","status":"affected","version":"71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_vcap_impl.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_vcap_impl.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.h","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs_kunit.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_kunit.c","drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_private.h"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.2"},{"lessThan":"6.2","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.6.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.6.145","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.97","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.40","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1.5","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.6.145","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.97","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.40","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1.5","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block\n\nThe VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked\nindependently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are\nbacked by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and\ncommand registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL\nregister and moves data through the shared cache registers.\n\nAccessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The\nper-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a\ndifferent lock.\n\nThe locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of\nthe vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs\ndecodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache\nread) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule\nwrite to another Super VCAP instance.\n\nBesides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache\nbetween the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer\ncommits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.\n\nIntroduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule\nlock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the\nper-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that\nserializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new\nadmin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the\ncontrol lock instead of a per-instance one.\n\nNo path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a\nsingle mutex cannot self-deadlock."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - Exploitation requires local kernel interfaces: tc-flower netlink/offload (ndo_setup_tc) to program VCAP rules and debugfs reads that issue hardware READs; remote packets do not reach this code path.\nAC:L - An attacker can reliably win the race by running concurrent threads—one repeatedly reading VCAP debugfs dumps while another issues tc-flower add/modify/delete operations on a different Super VCAP instance (IS0 vs IS2).\nPR:L - The tc-flower write path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, reachable by an unprivileged local user via user namespaces (unshare -Ur); debugfs VCAP dumps are readable with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, likewise obtainable in a user namespace.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required; the attacker self-triggers the race with automated concurrent debugfs reads and tc-flower netlink operations.\nS:U - Impact stays within the kernel/switch management security boundary—corrupting on-chip TCAM ACL entries and forwarding policy—not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-authority sandbox breakout.\nC:H - Corrupted Super VCAP TCAM entries can alter match/action fields to redirect or CPU-copy traffic to attacker-chosen ports, enabling interception of confidential traffic traversing the switch.\nI:H - The race causes arbitrary wrong key/mask/action data to be committed to hardware ACL entries, enabling unauthorized modification of line-rate switching policy including redirects, drops, and policing bypass.\nA:H - Corrupted TCAM rules can black-hole, misroute, or otherwise disable forwarding for arbitrary ports/VLANs on production SparX5/LAN969x switches, causing repeated high-impact network availability loss."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-17T05:42:59.028Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9"}],"title":"net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-72340","datePublished":"2026-08-15T05:55:47.119Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-09T03:40:39.920Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-17T05:42:59.028Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-15 06:22:07","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-17 06:18:37","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"72340","Ordinal":"1","Title":"net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block","CVE":"CVE-2026-72340","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"72340","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block\n\nThe VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked\nindependently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are\nbacked by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and\ncommand registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL\nregister and moves data through the shared cache registers.\n\nAccessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The\nper-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a\ndifferent lock.\n\nThe locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of\nthe vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs\ndecodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache\nread) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule\nwrite to another Super VCAP instance.\n\nBesides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache\nbetween the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer\ncommits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.\n\nIntroduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule\nlock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the\nper-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that\nserializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new\nadmin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the\ncontrol lock instead of a per-instance one.\n\nNo path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a\nsingle mutex cannot self-deadlock.","Type":"Description","Title":"net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block"}]}}}