{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-20T10:33:14+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-75083","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-75083","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-75083.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-75083","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75083"},"summary":{"title":"Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an out-of-bounds write in the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver","description":"The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255.\n\nBecause the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array.\n\nThe length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact.\n\nThe fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-10-14 17:19:10","updated_at":"2026-10-16 16:21:02"},"problem_types":["CWE-191","CWE-191 integer-overflow"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"5.9","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.9","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","data":{"baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/51d71864578c08eb1a1201f87b46ec81c8609d62","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/51d71864578c08eb1a1201f87b46ec81c8609d62","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2pwx-gg6f-535f","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2pwx-gg6f-535f","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-75083","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75083","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 1.8.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"75083","cve":"CVE-2026-75083","epss":"0.002290000","percentile":"0.127740000","score_date":"2026-10-16","updated_at":"2026-10-17 00:14:16"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-75083","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-10-16T15:25:03.202886Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-16T15:31:46.531Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"kw41z_isr"},{"name":"kw41z_rx"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"1.8.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255.\n\nBecause the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array.\n\nThe length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact.\n\nThe fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-191","description":"integer-overflow","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-14T16:45:56.541Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/51d71864578c08eb1a1201f87b46ec81c8609d62"},{"name":"GHSA-2pwx-gg6f-535f","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2pwx-gg6f-535f"}],"title":"Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an out-of-bounds write in the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-75083","datePublished":"2026-10-14T16:45:56.541Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-17T16:17:45.295Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-16T15:31:46.531Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-14 17:19:10","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-16 16:21:02","problem_types":["CWE-191","CWE-191 integer-overflow"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.6,"impactScore":4.2}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-10-16T15:25:03.202886Z","id":"CVE-2026-75083","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"75083","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an o","CVE":"CVE-2026-75083","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"75083","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255.\n\nBecause the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array.\n\nThe length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact.\n\nThe fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation.","Type":"Description","Title":"Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an o"}]}}}