{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-06T09:16:16+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-77463","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-77463","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-77463.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-77463","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77463"},"summary":{"title":"Remark42: Rate limit bypass via unconditional trust of X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers in direct-internet deployment","description":"Remark42 is a self-hosted comment engine for blogs, articles, or any other place where readers can add comments. From 1.0.0 until 1.16.2, Remark42 globally trusts True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-For without verifying that the direct peer is a trusted proxy, and middleware.RealIP overwrites r.RemoteAddr before per-IP controls run. In a directly reachable deployment, or a proxy that forwards attacker-controlled headers, a remote attacker can rotate spoofed forwarding headers to obtain fresh token buckets for rate-limited endpoints, bypass vote de-duplication when --votes-ip is enabled, mint anonymous identities, and poison stored comment IPs and request logs. The global concurrent-request throttle and per-request timeouts still limit availability impact. 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