{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-27T08:30:50+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-79978","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-79978","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-79978.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-79978","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79978"},"summary":{"title":"Out-of-bounds write in the ADXL345 sensor driver RTIO streaming FIFO read path","description":"The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.\n\nA short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream <dev> on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.\n\nThe out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-10-23 20:17:27","updated_at":"2026-10-26 13:52:21"},"problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"3.6","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","baseScore":3.6,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"3.6","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","data":{"baseScore":3.6,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4v56-r4qm-v964","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4v56-r4qm-v964","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-79978","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79978","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.0.0 4.4.2 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"4.4.2","status":"affected","version":"4.0.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.\n\nA short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream <dev> on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.\n\nThe out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":3.6,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-787","description":"bounds","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T19:56:14.995Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7"},{"name":"GHSA-4v56-r4qm-v964","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4v56-r4qm-v964"}],"title":"Out-of-bounds write in the ADXL345 sensor driver RTIO streaming FIFO read path","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-79978","datePublished":"2026-10-23T19:56:14.995Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-25T16:06:30.868Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T19:56:14.995Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-23 20:17:27","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-26 13:52:21","problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","baseScore":3.6,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW"},"exploitabilityScore":1,"impactScore":2.5}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"79978","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Out-of-bounds write in the ADXL345 sensor driver RTIO streaming ","CVE":"CVE-2026-79978","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"79978","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.\n\nA short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream <dev> on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.\n\nThe out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code.","Type":"Description","Title":"Out-of-bounds write in the ADXL345 sensor driver RTIO streaming "}]}}}