{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-29T12:12:57+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-80662","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-80662","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-80662.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80662","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80662"},"summary":{"title":"cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size\n\nThe CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58\nbytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing\n64 bytes at offset 0x18.  CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512,\neight times the actual on-device size.\n\nheader_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the\nRAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes.\nThe cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE\n(512) bytes from its source.  For the CPER caller the source is\nstruct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a\nstack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes\nof kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can\nread it via tracefs.\n\nSet CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it,\nbringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords.  Userspace tools\nsuch as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32)\nheader_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event.  Add\nCXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event\n__array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI.  Both callers now pass a\nzero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only\nthe first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware;\nthe remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring\nbuffer layout intact.\n\n[ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-08-28 08:16:51","updated_at":"2026-08-29 07:16:48"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.1","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.1","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80662","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80662","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9 6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9 fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9 c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.2","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.42 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1.5 7.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"80662","cve":"CVE-2026-80662","epss":"0.001660000","percentile":"0.060710000","score_date":"2026-08-28","updated_at":"2026-08-29 00:12:17"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/cxl/core/ras.c","drivers/cxl/core/trace.h","drivers/cxl/cxl.h"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d","status":"affected","version":"2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528","status":"affected","version":"2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416","status":"affected","version":"2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/cxl/core/ras.c","drivers/cxl/core/trace.h","drivers/cxl/cxl.h"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.2"},{"lessThan":"6.2","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.42","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1.5","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.42","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1.5","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2","versionStartIncluding":"6.2","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size\n\nThe CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58\nbytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing\n64 bytes at offset 0x18.  CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512,\neight times the actual on-device size.\n\nheader_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the\nRAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes.\nThe cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE\n(512) bytes from its source.  For the CPER caller the source is\nstruct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a\nstack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes\nof kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can\nread it via tracefs.\n\nSet CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it,\nbringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords.  Userspace tools\nsuch as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32)\nheader_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event.  Add\nCXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event\n__array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI.  Both callers now pass a\nzero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only\nthe first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware;\nthe remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring\nbuffer layout intact.\n\n[ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]"}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - The bug is only reached in kernel CXL RAS error handling (cxl_handle_ras via PCI AER cxl_error_detected, and CPER paths cxl_cper_post_prot_err/extlog_cxl_cper_handle_prot_err). Disclosure requires reading tracefs; there is no network, adjacent-radio, or direct physical-bus syscall entry to the vulnerable memcpy/readl sites.\nAC:L - With CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ACPI/CXL EINJ via debugfs einj_inject deterministically injects uncorrectable CXL protocol errors that traverse cxl_cper_handle_prot_err/cxl_handle_ras. Without root, a tracing-group member on CXL servers running rasdaemon can reliably capture the leak whenever organic uncorrectable RAS events occur.\nPR:L - Exploitation requires reading cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error data from tracefs (TRACE_MODE_READ 0440), routinely granted to tracing-group/rasdaemon service accounts on CXL/RAS deployments. Triggering on demand uses debugfs EINJ (root) or natural hardware errors; no init-namespace-only capability beyond tracefs DAC is needed for the stack leak.\nUI:N - Once CXL tracepoints are enabled (as rasdaemon does automatically), uncorrectable RAS/CPER processing copies the overlong header_log during kernel error handling. No victim mount, login, or interactive action is required beyond the attacker (or environment) having tracefs access when an error fires.\nS:U - The flaw leaks kernel stack/MMIO data into the trace ring buffer within the host kernel. Impact stays in the same OS security authority (local privilege/information gain) and does not cross guest/host, IOMMU, or container hardware trust boundaries.\nC:H - TP_fast_assign memcpy() copies 512 bytes from a 64-byte ras_cap.header_log on the stack, leaking 448 bytes of kernel stack into tracefs. header_log_copy() also readl()s 128 dwords from an 88-byte RAS iomap, an out-of-bounds read of adjacent MMIO/device memory.\nI:N - Both failure modes are out-of-bounds reads only (stack and MMIO). The trace event stores leaked bytes in the ring buffer but does not corrupt attacker-controlled memory or provide a direct arbitrary-write primitive.\nA:H - header_log_copy() performs 448 bytes of MMIO reads past the devm_ioremap() RAS window (0x58 bytes), which can provoke CPU/MMU faults or platform errors on out-of-range readl(). Uncorrectable-error handling itself can disable CXL.mem devices and force resets, impacting availability."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:21:47.605Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416"}],"title":"cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-80662","datePublished":"2026-08-28T06:49:06.277Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-26T14:34:25.781Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:21:47.605Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-28 08:16:51","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-29 07:16:48","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.1,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.2}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"80662","Ordinal":"1","Title":"cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size","CVE":"CVE-2026-80662","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"80662","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size\n\nThe CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58\nbytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing\n64 bytes at offset 0x18.  CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512,\neight times the actual on-device size.\n\nheader_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the\nRAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes.\nThe cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE\n(512) bytes from its source.  For the CPER caller the source is\nstruct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a\nstack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes\nof kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can\nread it via tracefs.\n\nSet CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it,\nbringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords.  Userspace tools\nsuch as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32)\nheader_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event.  Add\nCXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event\n__array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI.  Both callers now pass a\nzero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only\nthe first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware;\nthe remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring\nbuffer layout intact.\n\n[ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]","Type":"Description","Title":"cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size"}]}}}