{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-29T12:12:23+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-80674","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-80674","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-80674.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80674","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80674"},"summary":{"title":"ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator\n\nA base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()\nonly on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*\nattribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation\nat all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --\nntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and\nntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads\nattr_list_entry fixed-header fields\n(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with\nbounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident\nattribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive\nout-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.\n\nload_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),\nale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an\n\"al < al_start + size\" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the\nfixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.\n\nFactor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),\nwhich requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct\nattr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,\nthat ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the\nname, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.\nntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries\ntile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()\n(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the\nresident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped\nvalidation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other\ntwo attribute-list walks.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-08-28 08:16:52","updated_at":"2026-08-29 07:16:49"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80674","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80674","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669 55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669 7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 7.1","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.1.5 7.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"80674","cve":"CVE-2026-80674","epss":"0.001550000","percentile":"0.049750000","score_date":"2026-08-28","updated_at":"2026-08-29 00:12:17"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["fs/ntfs/attrib.c","fs/ntfs/attrib.h","fs/ntfs/inode.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812","status":"affected","version":"1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8","status":"affected","version":"1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["fs/ntfs/attrib.c","fs/ntfs/attrib.h","fs/ntfs/inode.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"7.1"},{"lessThan":"7.1","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.1.5","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.1.5","versionStartIncluding":"7.1","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2","versionStartIncluding":"7.1","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator\n\nA base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()\nonly on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*\nattribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation\nat all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --\nntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and\nntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads\nattr_list_entry fixed-header fields\n(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with\nbounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident\nattribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive\nout-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.\n\nload_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),\nale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an\n\"al < al_start + size\" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the\nfixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.\n\nFactor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),\nwhich requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct\nattr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,\nthat ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the\nname, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.\nntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries\ntile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()\n(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the\nresident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped\nvalidation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other\ntwo attribute-list walks."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:N - NTFS registers ntfs_export_ops; remote nfsd/ksmbd VFS lookups on an exported crafted NTFS volume reach ntfs_iget→ntfs_read_locked_inode and subsequent ntfs_external_attr_find/ntfs_attrlist_need walks without local syscall access.\nAC:L - Attacker fully controls on-disk resident $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry headers (length, name_offset, mft_reference) in a crafted image; triggering the slab OOB read is deterministic once the inode is accessed with no races.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires only read access to mounted NTFS content (e.g., NFS/SMB client on an exported share) or supplying removable media the host later mounts; the attribute-list walk paths need no init-namespace root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN.\nUI:N - Once a crafted NTFS volume is mounted and exported (or loop-mounted in a user namespace), normal remote lookups/opens or attribute operations reach the unvalidated resident attribute-list parsing without further victim interaction.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and potential kernel crash remain within the mounting host kernel security authority; this is standard filesystem metadata parsing, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox scope change.\nC:H - ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents(), and ntfs_attrlist_need() read attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn, mft_reference, name) past the kmalloc attr_list buffer end, disclosing adjacent slab heap memory.\nI:H - Attacker-controlled attribute-list lengths and offsets drive kernel parsing of forged metadata and adjacent slab contents; per kernel CNA guidance this memory-corruption class can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel modification or control-flow hijack beyond the immediate read.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds reads from the attribute-list buffer can fault on invalid adjacent memory or otherwise oops/panic the kernel during inode attribute walks on lookup, extent attach, or attribute-list maintenance paths."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8"}],"title":"ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-80674","datePublished":"2026-08-28T06:49:13.549Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-26T14:34:25.782Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-28 08:16:52","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-29 07:16:49","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"80674","Ordinal":"1","Title":"ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator","CVE":"CVE-2026-80674","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"80674","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator\n\nA base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()\nonly on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*\nattribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation\nat all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --\nntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and\nntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads\nattr_list_entry fixed-header fields\n(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with\nbounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident\nattribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive\nout-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.\n\nload_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),\nale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an\n\"al < al_start + size\" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the\nfixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.\n\nFactor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),\nwhich requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct\nattr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,\nthat ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the\nname, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.\nntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries\ntile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()\n(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the\nresident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped\nvalidation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other\ntwo attribute-list walks.","Type":"Description","Title":"ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator"}]}}}