{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-15T15:04:53+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-81010","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-81010","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-81010.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-81010","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81010"},"summary":{"title":"io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation\n\nio_waitid_cb() may run through the fallback task_work path when\ntask_work_add() can no longer queue work to the originating task. The\nfallback runs from a kworker and io_uring marks such task work as\ncanceled through tw.cancel.\n\nio_waitid_cb() currently ignores tw.cancel and calls __do_wait().\nwaitid is task-context dependent: __do_wait() performs child lookup\nrelative to current, and the retry path also uses\ncurrent->signal->wait_chldexit. If the callback runs from the fallback\nkworker, current is therefore not the task that submitted the request.\n\nHonor tw.cancel before entering __do_wait(). Complete the request with\n-ECANCELED and skip the siginfo copy, since canceled task work may run\nwithout the submitting task's userspace execution context.\n\nKeep the existing siginfo handling for normal waitid completion and\nexplicit cancellation.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-11 20:19:09","updated_at":"2026-09-14 13:18:55"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bc98e2de8c58a2bfaf0f540eb096a386ecfc96c","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bc98e2de8c58a2bfaf0f540eb096a386ecfc96c","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14572de82e5022899e5856008bc9cac97004a88c","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14572de82e5022899e5856008bc9cac97004a88c","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0879697520abda2383ed7be40572ad583b5c4b02","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0879697520abda2383ed7be40572ad583b5c4b02","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-81010","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81010","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b 0879697520abda2383ed7be40572ad583b5c4b02 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b 7bc98e2de8c58a2bfaf0f540eb096a386ecfc96c git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b 14572de82e5022899e5856008bc9cac97004a88c git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.7","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.7 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.52 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.4 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"81010","cve":"CVE-2026-81010","epss":"0.001290000","percentile":"0.028710000","score_date":"2026-09-14","updated_at":"2026-09-15 00:00:41"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["io_uring/waitid.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"0879697520abda2383ed7be40572ad583b5c4b02","status":"affected","version":"f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"7bc98e2de8c58a2bfaf0f540eb096a386ecfc96c","status":"affected","version":"f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"14572de82e5022899e5856008bc9cac97004a88c","status":"affected","version":"f31ecf671ddc498f20219453395794ff2383e06b","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["io_uring/waitid.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.7"},{"lessThan":"6.7","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.52","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.4","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.52","versionStartIncluding":"6.7","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.4","versionStartIncluding":"6.7","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc1","versionStartIncluding":"6.7","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation\n\nio_waitid_cb() may run through the fallback task_work path when\ntask_work_add() can no longer queue work to the originating task. The\nfallback runs from a kworker and io_uring marks such task work as\ncanceled through tw.cancel.\n\nio_waitid_cb() currently ignores tw.cancel and calls __do_wait().\nwaitid is task-context dependent: __do_wait() performs child lookup\nrelative to current, and the retry path also uses\ncurrent->signal->wait_chldexit. If the callback runs from the fallback\nkworker, current is therefore not the task that submitted the request.\n\nHonor tw.cancel before entering __do_wait(). Complete the request with\n-ECANCELED and skip the siginfo copy, since canceled task work may run\nwithout the submitting task's userspace execution context.\n\nKeep the existing siginfo handling for normal waitid completion and\nexplicit cancellation."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - The bug is reached by submitting IORING_OP_WAITID via io_uring_setup/io_uring_enter, then forcing canceled task_work by closing the ring or exiting the submitting task. Per kernel scoring guidance, io_uring bugs are Local.\nAC:L - The attacker controls the full sequence: create a DEFER_TASKRUN ring, submit WAITID, fork/signal children so io_waitid_wait queues io_waitid_cb, then close the ring so io_ring_exit_work runs that callback from a kworker with tw.cancel set. No uninfluenced race or rare config is required.\nPR:L - Unprivileged users can create an io_uring ring (sysctl_io_uring_disabled defaults to 0) and IORING_OP_WAITID has no capability check; waiting on one's own children needs no privilege. User namespaces or init-namespace root are not required.\nUI:N - The attacker performs every step in their own process (ring setup, WAITID submission, child fork/signal, and ring close or exit). No other user must act.\nS:U - Wrong-context waitid completion and the resulting kernel memory corruption stay within the host kernel's security authority. This is standard local privilege-escalation/DoS impact, not a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Ignoring tw.cancel lets io_waitid_cb run __do_wait and unsafe_put_user of siginfo from a PF_KTHREAD fallback worker whose lazy-TLB CR3 may be another mm, including one concurrently torn down by exit_mmap, yielding memory corruption over reused pages/page tables that can be leveraged for kernel disclosure.\nI:H - The same kworker path writes siginfo fields through unsafe_put_user to an attacker-chosen userspace address without the submitter's mm, and the -ERESTARTSYS retry can add a wait-queue entry on the kworker's wait_chldexit. Wrong-mm writes and wait-queue corruption are High-integrity primitives.\nA:H - Userspace access against a missing or tearing-down mm, and wait-queue manipulation on the wrong task, produce kernel faults, oopses, and panics; the unexploited fallback path can also crash or hang ring-teardown. Any kernel crash is High availability."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-14T11:59:42.822Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0879697520abda2383ed7be40572ad583b5c4b02"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bc98e2de8c58a2bfaf0f540eb096a386ecfc96c"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14572de82e5022899e5856008bc9cac97004a88c"}],"title":"io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-81010","datePublished":"2026-09-11T19:43:00.754Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-26T14:34:25.813Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-14T11:59:42.822Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-11 20:19:09","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-14 13:18:55","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"81010","Ordinal":"1","Title":"io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation","CVE":"CVE-2026-81010","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"81010","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation\n\nio_waitid_cb() may run through the fallback task_work path when\ntask_work_add() can no longer queue work to the originating task. The\nfallback runs from a kworker and io_uring marks such task work as\ncanceled through tw.cancel.\n\nio_waitid_cb() currently ignores tw.cancel and calls __do_wait().\nwaitid is task-context dependent: __do_wait() performs child lookup\nrelative to current, and the retry path also uses\ncurrent->signal->wait_chldexit. If the callback runs from the fallback\nkworker, current is therefore not the task that submitted the request.\n\nHonor tw.cancel before entering __do_wait(). Complete the request with\n-ECANCELED and skip the siginfo copy, since canceled task work may run\nwithout the submitting task's userspace execution context.\n\nKeep the existing siginfo handling for normal waitid completion and\nexplicit cancellation.","Type":"Description","Title":"io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation"}]}}}