{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-14T19:16:33+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-82430","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-82430","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-82430.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82430","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82430"},"summary":{"title":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root via Container Command Files Chowned to the Tenant","description":"Description\n\nWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the\nentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command\nfile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without\nre-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.\n\nFor the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a\nprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,\n`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an\nattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.\n\nFor the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no\nsource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the\ncontainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only\nagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,\nand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology\nsubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and\nreinstalled after upgrading.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"apache","published_at":"2026-09-14 15:17:09","updated_at":"2026-09-14 16:17:20"},"problem_types":["CWE-367","CWE-367 CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition"],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/10","name":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/10","refsource":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/8d5pkn486p8vrz5klg6onk5r8k9sd9lv","name":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/8d5pkn486p8vrz5klg6onk5r8k9sd9lv","refsource":"security@apache.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82430","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82430","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher","version":"affected 3.0.0 3.1.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"The ASF using Claude Agents","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-14T15:13:47.599Z","orgId":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108","shortName":"CVE"},"references":[{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/10"}],"title":"CVE Program Container"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"org.apache.storm:storm-core","product":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","versions":[{"lessThan":"3.1.0","status":"affected","version":"3.0.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"The ASF using Claude Agents"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<b>Description</b><br><br>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the<br>entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command<br>file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without<br>re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.<br><br>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a<br>privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,<br>`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an<br>attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.<br><br>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no<br>source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the<br>container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only<br>against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.<br><br><b>Mitigation</b><br><br>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,<br>and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.<br><br>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology<br>submission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and<br>reinstalled after upgrading.<br><br><b>Credit</b><br><br>The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."}],"value":"Description\n\nWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the\nentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command\nfile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without\nre-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.\n\nFor the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a\nprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,\n`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an\nattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.\n\nFor the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no\nsource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the\ncontainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only\nagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,\nand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology\nsubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and\nreinstalled after upgrading.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."}],"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"text":"important"},"type":"Textual description of severity"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-367","description":"CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-14T14:15:58.744Z","orgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","shortName":"apache"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/8d5pkn486p8vrz5klg6onk5r8k9sd9lv"}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root via Container Command Files Chowned to the Tenant","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 1.0.3"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","assignerShortName":"apache","cveId":"CVE-2026-82430","datePublished":"2026-09-14T14:15:58.744Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-29T10:18:19.828Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-14T15:13:47.599Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-14 15:17:09","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-14 16:17:20","problem_types":["CWE-367","CWE-367 CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition"],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"82430","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root","CVE":"CVE-2026-82430","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"82430","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Description\n\nWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the\nentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command\nfile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without\nre-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.\n\nFor the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a\nprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,\n`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an\nattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.\n\nFor the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no\nsource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the\ncontainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only\nagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,\nand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology\nsubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and\nreinstalled after upgrading.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.","Type":"Description","Title":"Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root"}]}}}