{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-07T09:11:18+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-86219","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-86219","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-86219.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-86219","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86219"},"summary":{"title":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step","description":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"CPANSec","published_at":"2026-09-06 18:17:23","updated_at":"2026-09-06 18:17:23"},"problem_types":["CWE-294","CWE-294 CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay"],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2","name":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222","name":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch","name":"https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes","name":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414","name":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918","name":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-86219","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86219","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[],"timeline":[],"solutions":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"Upgrade to Authen-SASL 2.2100 or later.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://cpan.org/modules","defaultStatus":"unaffected","modules":["Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5"],"packageName":"Authen-SASL","packageURL":"pkg:cpan/Authen-SASL","programFiles":["lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5::server_step"},{"name":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5::server_start"}],"repo":"https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl","versions":[{"lessThan":"2.2100","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"custom"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-115","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-294","description":"CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-06T17:46:30.340Z","orgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","shortName":"CPANSec"},"references":[{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414"},{"url":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch"},{"tags":["release-notes"],"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes"},{"tags":["related"],"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Upgrade to Authen-SASL 2.2100 or later."}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step","x_generator":{"engine":"cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","assignerShortName":"CPANSec","cveId":"CVE-2026-86219","datePublished":"2026-09-06T17:46:30.340Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-06T00:13:35.358Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-06T17:46:30.340Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-06 18:17:23","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-06 18:17:23","problem_types":["CWE-294","CWE-294 CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay"],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"86219","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl a","CVE":"CVE-2026-86219","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"86219","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.","Type":"Description","Title":"Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl a"}]}}}