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Prior to version 1.31.3, when the OIDC login flow completes, backend/modules/auth/providers/auth_oidc_provider.py decodes the id_token returned by the identity provider's token endpoint using jose.jwt.get_unverified_claims() instead of jwt.decode(). This skips signature verification, audience (aud) validation, issuer (iss) validation, and expiry (exp) checking entirely. The extracted claims (email/sub/preferred_username) are then used directly as the user_id for the resulting Tugtainer session. This issue has been patched in version 1.31.3.","Type":"Description","Title":"Tugtainer: OIDC id_token claims accepted without signature/audie"}]}}}