{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-04T09:48:57+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-87043","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-87043","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-87043.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-87043","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87043"},"summary":{"title":"sys_rand_get() silently returns an unwritten buffer when the entropy device is not ready","description":"The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret.\n\nThe \"not ready\" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio).\n\nWhen this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire.\n\nThe fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-11-04 06:17:07","updated_at":"2026-11-04 06:17:07"},"problem_types":["CWE-330","CWE-330 crypto"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"4.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"4.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","data":{"baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j6p3-2pm6-rrj9","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j6p3-2pm6-rrj9","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/76eb10b5c3e93de5218cc9f1aa313ece3eb5a6e6","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/76eb10b5c3e93de5218cc9f1aa313ece3eb5a6e6","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-87043","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87043","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"rand_get"},{"name":"z_impl_sys_rand_get"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret.\n\nThe \"not ready\" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio).\n\nWhen this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire.\n\nThe fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-330","description":"crypto","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-04T06:09:08.600Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/76eb10b5c3e93de5218cc9f1aa313ece3eb5a6e6"},{"name":"GHSA-j6p3-2pm6-rrj9","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j6p3-2pm6-rrj9"}],"title":"sys_rand_get() silently returns an unwritten buffer when the entropy device is not ready","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-87043","datePublished":"2026-11-04T06:09:08.600Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-08T18:40:48.081Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-04T06:09:08.600Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-04 06:17:07","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-04 06:17:07","problem_types":["CWE-330","CWE-330 crypto"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":2.2,"impactScore":2.5}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"87043","Ordinal":"1","Title":"sys_rand_get() silently returns an unwritten buffer when the ent","CVE":"CVE-2026-87043","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"87043","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret.\n\nThe \"not ready\" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio).\n\nWhen this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire.\n\nThe fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device.","Type":"Description","Title":"sys_rand_get() silently returns an unwritten buffer when the ent"}]}}}