{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-27T14:40:07+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-89407","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-89407","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-89407.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89407","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89407"},"summary":{"title":"jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber() enables ReDoS","description":"NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates \"stringified numbers\" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. \n\n\n\nMatching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. \n\n\n\nAn attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). \n\n\n\nBecause StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. \n\n\n\nTesting by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. \n\n\n\nThe affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. \n\n\n\nThe fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"HeroDevs","published_at":"2026-09-22 15:17:21","updated_at":"2026-09-22 20:00:03"},"problem_types":["CWE-400","CWE-1333","CWE-1333 CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity","CWE-400 CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","type":"Secondary","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/issues/1649","name":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/issues/1649","refsource":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1650","name":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1650","refsource":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89","name":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89","refsource":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1701","name":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1701","refsource":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89407","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89407","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"FasterXML","product":"jackson-core","version":"affected 2.17.0 2.18.10 maven","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"FasterXML","product":"jackson-core","version":"affected 2.19.0 2.21.6 maven","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"FasterXML","product":"jackson-core","version":"affected 2.22.0 2.22.2 maven","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"FasterXML","product":"jackson-core","version":"affected 3.0.0 3.1.6 maven","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"FasterXML","product":"jackson-core","version":"affected 3.2.0 3.2.1 maven","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.18.11, 2.21.7 or 2.22.3, or to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core 3.1.7 or 3.2.2. The 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x and 3.0.x lines received no fix on their own branch and are no longer maintained upstream; consumers of those lines must move forward to a maintained release.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"workarounds":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"Until upgrading, lower StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength well below its default of 20,000,000 characters so that oversized string tokens are rejected before number coercion, and apply wall-clock timeouts to parse and coercion operations. Because matching cost is quadratic in token length, a tight length bound substantially reduces worst-case cost. These are mitigations, not a complete fix.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"manqingzhou","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"89407","cve":"CVE-2026-89407","epss":"0.006300000","percentile":"0.488360000","score_date":"2026-09-23","updated_at":"2026-09-24 00:07:16"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-89407","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-09-22T15:52:15.349840Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-22T15:52:44.881Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"references":[{"tags":["exploit"],"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89"}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://repo1.maven.org/maven2","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core","product":"jackson-core","programRoutines":[{"name":"com.fasterxml.jackson.core.io.NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber"}],"repo":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core","vendor":"FasterXML","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"2.18.10","status":"affected","version":"2.17.0","versionType":"maven"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"2.21.6","status":"affected","version":"2.19.0","versionType":"maven"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"2.22.2","status":"affected","version":"2.22.0","versionType":"maven"}]},{"collectionURL":"https://repo1.maven.org/maven2","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"tools.jackson.core:jackson-core","product":"jackson-core","programRoutines":[{"name":"tools.jackson.core.io.NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber"}],"repo":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core","vendor":"FasterXML","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"3.1.6","status":"affected","version":"3.0.0","versionType":"maven"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"3.2.1","status":"affected","version":"3.2.0","versionType":"maven"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"manqingzhou"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<p>NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates \"stringified numbers\" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.&nbsp;</p><p>Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.&nbsp;</p><p>An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float).&nbsp;</p><p>Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex.&nbsp;</p><p>Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool.&nbsp;</p><p>The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected.&nbsp;</p><p>The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.</p>"}],"value":"NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates \"stringified numbers\" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. \n\n\n\nMatching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. \n\n\n\nAn attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). \n\n\n\nBecause StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. \n\n\n\nTesting by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. \n\n\n\nThe affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. \n\n\n\nThe fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-1333","description":"CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-400","description":"CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-22T14:53:20.999Z","orgId":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","shortName":"HeroDevs"},"references":[{"name":"GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89","tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-p6pp-m3f8-5c89"},{"name":"FasterXML/jackson-core#1649","tags":["issue-tracking"],"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/issues/1649"},{"name":"FasterXML/jackson-core#1650","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1650"},{"name":"FasterXML/jackson-core#1701 (2.18 backport)","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1701"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<p>Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.18.11, 2.21.7 or 2.22.3, or to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core 3.1.7 or 3.2.2. The 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x and 3.0.x lines received no fix on their own branch and are no longer maintained upstream; consumers of those lines must move forward to a maintained release.</p>"}],"value":"Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.18.11, 2.21.7 or 2.22.3, or to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core 3.1.7 or 3.2.2. The 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x and 3.0.x lines received no fix on their own branch and are no longer maintained upstream; consumers of those lines must move forward to a maintained release."}],"title":"jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber() enables ReDoS","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<p>Until upgrading, lower StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength well below its default of 20,000,000 characters so that oversized string tokens are rejected before number coercion, and apply wall-clock timeouts to parse and coercion operations. Because matching cost is quadratic in token length, a tight length bound substantially reduces worst-case cost. These are mitigations, not a complete fix.</p>"}],"value":"Until upgrading, lower StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength well below its default of 20,000,000 characters so that oversized string tokens are rejected before number coercion, and apply wall-clock timeouts to parse and coercion operations. Because matching cost is quadratic in token length, a tight length bound substantially reduces worst-case cost. These are mitigations, not a complete fix."}]}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","assignerShortName":"HeroDevs","cveId":"CVE-2026-89407","datePublished":"2026-09-22T14:53:20.999Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-11T16:07:58.141Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-22T15:52:44.881Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-22 15:17:21","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-22 20:00:03","problem_types":["CWE-400","CWE-1333","CWE-1333 CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity","CWE-400 CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542c","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":3.6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-09-22T15:52:15.349840Z","id":"CVE-2026-89407","options":[{"exploitation":"poc"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"89407","Ordinal":"1","Title":"jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOA","CVE":"CVE-2026-89407","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"89407","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates \"stringified numbers\" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. \n\n\n\nMatching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. \n\n\n\nAn attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). \n\n\n\nBecause StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. \n\n\n\nTesting by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. \n\n\n\nThe affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. \n\n\n\nThe fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.","Type":"Description","Title":"jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOA"}]}}}