{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-16T20:31:42+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-90001","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-90001","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-90001.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90001","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90001"},"summary":{"title":"HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops->hdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration's reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-16 11:17:11","updated_at":"2026-09-16 15:18:23"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90001","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90001","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c 401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c 9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.11","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.11 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.110 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.51 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.5 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc2 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459","status":"affected","version":"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c","status":"affected","version":"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e","status":"affected","version":"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0","status":"affected","version":"ebc0d8093e8c97de459615438edefad1a4ac352c","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_struct_ops.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.11"},{"lessThan":"6.11","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.110","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.51","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.5","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc2","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.110","versionStartIncluding":"6.11","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.51","versionStartIncluding":"6.11","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.5","versionStartIncluding":"6.11","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc2","versionStartIncluding":"6.11","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops->hdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration's reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - HID-BPF attach and unreg are reached only through local bpf() syscalls (BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS / BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS). Concurrent hid_destroy_device() is also local (uhid UHID_DESTROY/close or HID teardown), not a network or adjacent-radio packet path.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the TOCTOU race: attach HID-BPF, then concurrently delete the struct_ops map (hid_bpf_unreg) and destroy the HID device (e.g. uhid close). Destroy never took prog_list_lock, so unreg does not block on it and the double-put is reliably hittable.\nPR:L - Loading STRUCT_OPS maps/programs requires CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, which can be delegated via BPF tokens into user namespaces rather than init-namespace root. /dev/uhid is also granted to the seat user on typical desktop systems, so real root is not required.\nUI:N - The attacker creates their own uhid HID device, loads and attaches HID-BPF struct_ops, then races map delete against device destroy in their own processes. No victim action such as plugging in hardware or mounting a filesystem is required.\nS:U - The double-put use-after-free of struct hid_device stays inside the host kernel HID/BPF authority and is a standard local privilege-escalation primitive, not a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Double-putting struct hid_device frees it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Use-after-free of this large kobject, which holds driver callbacks and pointers, enables an attacker-controlled kernel memory read primitive.\nI:H - The same use-after-free lets the attacker reclaim the freed hid_device via heap spray and corrupt ll_driver/hiddev function pointers or adjacent heap objects, yielding arbitrary kernel writes and control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, dropping the hid_device refcount to zero while hid_remove_device()/put_device() still run causes a kernel oops, panic, or hang on the subsequent use of freed memory."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-16T14:41:17.464Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401359684620145be710de97b87e1a47abfe1459"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7f927aa8b55008ed5ea0814313d5dad771dcf3c"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfb7939788f3c8dd080a4dd81e38d625b35d194e"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdc7e6dc7a99ad7311ad5e7c145f2b9ce4e24b0"}],"title":"HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-90001","datePublished":"2026-09-16T10:33:12.063Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-11T19:38:34.780Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-16T14:41:17.464Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-16 11:17:11","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-16 15:18:23","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90001","Ordinal":"1","Title":"HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destr","CVE":"CVE-2026-90001","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90001","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path\n\n__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the\nsame registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and\nfreeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the\nremove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one\npath releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev\nunder the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path\nalready cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is\ndropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes\nops->hdev == NULL under the lock.\n\nBackground: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one\ndevice reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:\n\n- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device()\n  -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list\n  under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;\n- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls\n  st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for\n  its own registration.\n\nThe coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs\n\"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two\npaths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs\nprog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as\nnon-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the\ndestroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same\nreference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement\nis individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the\ndevice is simply freed while the transport is still inside\nhid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.\n\nThe fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on\nboth sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With\nthe lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no\nREAD_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.\n\nUnlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of\nhid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path\nitself still holds this registration's reference (released only by\nits own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy\ntraversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal\nre-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two\npaths releases each registration reference.","Type":"Description","Title":"HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destr"}]}}}