{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-23T12:06:24+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-90069","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-90069","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-90069.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90069","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90069"},"summary":{"title":"crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning\n\nACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the\nsynchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers\nclone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()\ncurrently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no\nstorage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT\nwrite past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report\na slab OOB write.\n\nAllocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,\ncopy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the\nexisting fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize\nbecause an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-17 17:16:55","updated_at":"2026-09-18 18:17:40"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90069","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90069","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a 889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.16","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.16 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.52 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.6 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"90069","cve":"CVE-2026-90069","epss":"0.001610000","percentile":"0.057750000","score_date":"2026-09-20","updated_at":"2026-09-21 00:10:09"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["crypto/acompress.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2","status":"affected","version":"097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b","status":"affected","version":"097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880","status":"affected","version":"097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["crypto/acompress.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.16"},{"lessThan":"6.16","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.52","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.6","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.52","versionStartIncluding":"6.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.6","versionStartIncluding":"6.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc1","versionStartIncluding":"6.16","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning\n\nACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the\nsynchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers\nclone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()\ncurrently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no\nstorage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT\nwrite past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report\na slab OOB write.\n\nAllocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,\ncopy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the\nexisting fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize\nbecause an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - The undersized clone is produced only by ACOMP_REQUEST_CLONE in ubifs_compress_common()/ubifs_decompress_common(), reached from local VFS writeback (write/fsync → ubifs_writepage → do_writepage → ubifs_jnl_write_data → ubifs_compress_folio) or read (ubifs_read_folio → read_block → ubifs_decompress_folio). IPComp uses acomp_request_alloc_extra() and never clones, so no protocol message carries this bug.\nAC:L - When UBIFS's compressor tfm is async, crypto_acomp_compress()/crypto_acomp_decompress() return -EAGAIN for every ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK request, and the following ACOMP_REQUEST_CLONE plus QAT qat_comp_alg_compress_decompress() write through acomp_request_ctx() always overflows the kmemdup; there is no race or uninfluenced layout to win.\nPR:L - An unprivileged user with write permission on a UBIFS inode that inherited UBIFS_COMPR_FL triggers the clone by writing ≥ UBIFS_MIN_COMPR_LEN bytes and fsync(); ubifs_fs_type has no FS_USERNS_MOUNT, but an already-mounted volume needs no capability beyond ordinary file write access.\nUI:N - The attacker creates and writes their own file on the mounted UBIFS volume and forces writeback with fsync() into ubifs_jnl_write_data(); no other user must mount an image or open a file.\nS:U - qat_comp_alg_compress_decompress() writes struct qat_compression_req through acomp_request_ctx() into kernel slab adjacent to the clone; the corruption stays in kernel memory and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or guest/host boundary.\nC:H - The entire qat_compression_req (firmware request, DMA buffer pointers, qat_compression_ctx * and acomp_req *) is stored past the kmemdup of sizeof(struct acomp_req), so qat_comp_generic_callback() later reads those fields from neighboring slab objects, giving an arbitrary kernel read after heap grooming.\nI:H - qat_comp_alg_compress_decompress() performs a slab out-of-bounds write of sizeof(struct qat_compression_req) via acomp_request_ctx() on the clone, overwriting adjacent heap objects including function pointers and providing a control-flow hijack and arbitrary-write primitive.\nA:H - KASAN reports a slab out-of-bounds write through acomp_request_ctx() on the undersized clone, and overflowing qat_compression_req into the next slab object oopses or panics on the QAT callback or allocator integrity check."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-18T17:52:52.872Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880"}],"title":"crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-90069","datePublished":"2026-09-17T16:05:50.894Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-11T19:38:34.784Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-18T17:52:52.872Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-17 17:16:55","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-18 18:17:40","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90069","Ordinal":"1","Title":"crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning","CVE":"CVE-2026-90069","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90069","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning\n\nACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the\nsynchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers\nclone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()\ncurrently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no\nstorage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT\nwrite past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report\na slab OOB write.\n\nAllocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,\ncopy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the\nexisting fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize\nbecause an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.","Type":"Description","Title":"crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning"}]}}}