{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-13T00:29:34+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-90587","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-90587","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-90587.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90587","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90587"},"summary":{"title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Zephyr USB host stack when a device reports zero configurations","description":"usbh_device_init() in subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c rejects a device whose device descriptor advertises bNumConfigurations == 0, but it only logs the error and jumps to the cleanup label without setting the return code. At that point the local err is still 0 from the preceding successful descriptor read, so the function returns success while having skipped usbh_device_set_configuration() — the only place udev->cfg_desc is allocated. The device structure is zero-initialised by usbh_device_alloc(), so udev->cfg_desc remains NULL.\n\nusbh_device_connect() treats the zero return as a successful enumeration and calls usbh_class_probe_device(), which starts its descriptor walk from udev->cfg_desc. usbh_desc_get_next_function() passes that NULL pointer to usbh_desc_is_valid(), whose only guard compares the caller-supplied size, so head->bLength is read through a NULL pointer.\n\nThe condition is triggered entirely by the attached peripheral: attaching a USB device (or any USB gadget emulating one) that reports bNumConfigurations = 0 reaches the defect directly from the UHC_EVT_DEV_CONNECTED_FS/_HS event handler in subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c, with no authentication and no user interaction beyond the physical attachment.\n\nOn targets where page zero is unmapped or CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION is enabled this raises a fatal exception in the USB host thread, denying service to the host. Where address zero is readable, the descriptor walker instead parses low memory as a descriptor chain and can dispatch a class probe() with attacker-influenced values, causing further out-of-bounds reads through the still-NULL udev->cfg_desc in usbh_desc_get_iface(). No attacker-controlled write was identified, so the impact is availability plus a bounded out-of-bounds read. Note that CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK is marked experimental.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-11-09 22:18:56","updated_at":"2026-11-12 18:17:54"},"problem_types":["CWE-476","CWE-476 memory-safety"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"4.6","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":4.6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"4.6","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"baseScore":4.6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/04e4284b4c3d3cd41791d44d7c39361e268b4d02","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/04e4284b4c3d3cd41791d44d7c39361e268b4d02","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9pxv-6992-2g24","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9pxv-6992-2g24","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90587","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90587","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"90587","cve":"CVE-2026-90587","epss":"0.001780000","percentile":"0.074220000","score_date":"2026-11-12","updated_at":"2026-11-13 00:14:36"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-90587","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-11-12T17:18:32.385537Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-12T17:18:45.997Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/usb/host/usbh_class.c","subsys/usb/host/usbh_desc.c","subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"usbh_class_probe_device"},{"name":"usbh_desc_get_next_function"},{"name":"usbh_device_init"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"usbh_device_init() in subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c rejects a device whose device descriptor advertises bNumConfigurations == 0, but it only logs the error and jumps to the cleanup label without setting the return code. At that point the local err is still 0 from the preceding successful descriptor read, so the function returns success while having skipped usbh_device_set_configuration() — the only place udev->cfg_desc is allocated. The device structure is zero-initialised by usbh_device_alloc(), so udev->cfg_desc remains NULL.\n\nusbh_device_connect() treats the zero return as a successful enumeration and calls usbh_class_probe_device(), which starts its descriptor walk from udev->cfg_desc. usbh_desc_get_next_function() passes that NULL pointer to usbh_desc_is_valid(), whose only guard compares the caller-supplied size, so head->bLength is read through a NULL pointer.\n\nThe condition is triggered entirely by the attached peripheral: attaching a USB device (or any USB gadget emulating one) that reports bNumConfigurations = 0 reaches the defect directly from the UHC_EVT_DEV_CONNECTED_FS/_HS event handler in subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c, with no authentication and no user interaction beyond the physical attachment.\n\nOn targets where page zero is unmapped or CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION is enabled this raises a fatal exception in the USB host thread, denying service to the host. Where address zero is readable, the descriptor walker instead parses low memory as a descriptor chain and can dispatch a class probe() with attacker-influenced values, causing further out-of-bounds reads through the still-NULL udev->cfg_desc in usbh_desc_get_iface(). No attacker-controlled write was identified, so the impact is availability plus a bounded out-of-bounds read. Note that CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK is marked experimental."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":4.6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-476","description":"memory-safety","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-09T22:03:59.315Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/04e4284b4c3d3cd41791d44d7c39361e268b4d02"},{"name":"GHSA-9pxv-6992-2g24","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9pxv-6992-2g24"}],"title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Zephyr USB host stack when a device reports zero configurations","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-90587","datePublished":"2026-11-09T22:03:59.315Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-12T18:04:39.470Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-12T17:18:45.997Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-09 22:18:56","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-12 18:17:54","problem_types":["CWE-476","CWE-476 memory-safety"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":4.6,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":0.9,"impactScore":3.6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-12T17:18:32.385537Z","id":"CVE-2026-90587","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90587","Ordinal":"1","Title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Zephyr USB host stack when a dev","CVE":"CVE-2026-90587","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"90587","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"usbh_device_init() in subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c rejects a device whose device descriptor advertises bNumConfigurations == 0, but it only logs the error and jumps to the cleanup label without setting the return code. At that point the local err is still 0 from the preceding successful descriptor read, so the function returns success while having skipped usbh_device_set_configuration() — the only place udev->cfg_desc is allocated. The device structure is zero-initialised by usbh_device_alloc(), so udev->cfg_desc remains NULL.\n\nusbh_device_connect() treats the zero return as a successful enumeration and calls usbh_class_probe_device(), which starts its descriptor walk from udev->cfg_desc. usbh_desc_get_next_function() passes that NULL pointer to usbh_desc_is_valid(), whose only guard compares the caller-supplied size, so head->bLength is read through a NULL pointer.\n\nThe condition is triggered entirely by the attached peripheral: attaching a USB device (or any USB gadget emulating one) that reports bNumConfigurations = 0 reaches the defect directly from the UHC_EVT_DEV_CONNECTED_FS/_HS event handler in subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c, with no authentication and no user interaction beyond the physical attachment.\n\nOn targets where page zero is unmapped or CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION is enabled this raises a fatal exception in the USB host thread, denying service to the host. Where address zero is readable, the descriptor walker instead parses low memory as a descriptor chain and can dispatch a class probe() with attacker-influenced values, causing further out-of-bounds reads through the still-NULL udev->cfg_desc in usbh_desc_get_iface(). No attacker-controlled write was identified, so the impact is availability plus a bounded out-of-bounds read. Note that CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK is marked experimental.","Type":"Description","Title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Zephyr USB host stack when a dev"}]}}}