{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-17T20:26:10+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-93201","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-93201","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-93201.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93201","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93201"},"summary":{"title":"dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory\n\ncache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of\ncache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache\nsegment id from the cache device metadata and index cache->segments[]\nwith it without checking it against cache->n_segs. That metadata is only\nCRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache\ndevice on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range\nvalue forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and\nwritten through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.\n\nAdd cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode\nsite, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.\nBound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)\nrather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below\nseg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed\nstructs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would\nstill be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs <=\nseg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images\nare unaffected.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-17 17:18:16","updated_at":"2026-09-17 17:18:16"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93201","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93201","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.18","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.6 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache.h","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_gc.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_key.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_writeback.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4","status":"affected","version":"1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098","status":"affected","version":"1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache.h","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_gc.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_key.c","drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache_writeback.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.18"},{"lessThan":"6.18","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.6","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.6","versionStartIncluding":"6.18","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc1","versionStartIncluding":"6.18","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory\n\ncache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of\ncache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache\nsegment id from the cache device metadata and index cache->segments[]\nwith it without checking it against cache->n_segs. That metadata is only\nCRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache\ndevice on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range\nvalue forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and\nwritten through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.\n\nAdd cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode\nsite, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.\nBound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)\nrather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below\nseg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed\nstructs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would\nstill be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs <=\nseg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images\nare unaffected."}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-17T16:12:22.392Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bf8af5e7d7db4c5e179e15017da55857761ac4"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90c990a68460d7b5720e5634cf650eccdf0f4098"}],"title":"dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-93201","datePublished":"2026-09-17T16:12:22.392Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-17T16:02:15.092Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-17T16:12:22.392Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-17 17:18:16","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-17 17:18:16","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93201","Ordinal":"1","Title":"dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory","CVE":"CVE-2026-93201","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93201","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory\n\ncache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of\ncache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache\nsegment id from the cache device metadata and index cache->segments[]\nwith it without checking it against cache->n_segs. That metadata is only\nCRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache\ndevice on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range\nvalue forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and\nwritten through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data.\n\nAdd cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode\nsite, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array.\nBound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs)\nrather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below\nseg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed\nstructs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would\nstill be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs <=\nseg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images\nare unaffected.","Type":"Description","Title":"dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory"}]}}}