{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-16T23:53:54+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-93667","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-93667","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-93667.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93667","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93667"},"summary":{"title":"Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN-tagged frame finds no handling virtual interface","description":"The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).\n\nThe fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.\n\nThe resulting call passes a struct net_if  where the driver expects a struct device  and a struct net_pkt  where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.\n\nThe same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-11-16 22:18:26","updated_at":"2026-11-16 22:18:26"},"problem_types":["CWE-686","CWE-688","CWE-843","CWE-686 memory-safety","CWE-688 memory-safety","CWE-843 memory-safety"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"5.9","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.9","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","data":{"baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/226e821d8587aaae955b9682234b0b44722c8a4e","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/226e821d8587aaae955b9682234b0b44722c8a4e","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5q52-q965-fwp8","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5q52-q965-fwp8","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93667","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93667","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.2.0 4.3.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"virtual_recv"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.3.2","status":"affected","version":"4.2.0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).\n\nThe fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.\n\nThe resulting call passes a struct net_if  where the driver expects a struct device  and a struct net_pkt  where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.\n\nThe same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-686","description":"memory-safety","lang":"en","type":"CWE"},{"cweId":"CWE-688","description":"memory-safety","lang":"en","type":"CWE"},{"cweId":"CWE-843","description":"memory-safety","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-16T21:19:13.856Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/226e821d8587aaae955b9682234b0b44722c8a4e"},{"name":"GHSA-5q52-q965-fwp8","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5q52-q965-fwp8"}],"title":"Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN-tagged frame finds no handling virtual interface","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-93667","datePublished":"2026-11-16T21:19:13.856Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-18T13:48:50.342Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-16T21:19:13.856Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-16 22:18:26","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-16 22:18:26","problem_types":["CWE-686","CWE-688","CWE-843","CWE-686 memory-safety","CWE-688 memory-safety","CWE-843 memory-safety"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H","baseScore":5.9,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.6,"impactScore":4.2}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93667","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN","CVE":"CVE-2026-93667","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93667","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).\n\nThe fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.\n\nThe resulting call passes a struct net_if  where the driver expects a struct device  and a struct net_pkt  where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.\n\nThe same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.","Type":"Description","Title":"Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN"}]}}}