{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-16T23:53:53+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-93672","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-93672","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-93672.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93672","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93672"},"summary":{"title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Bluetooth host ATT request lookup (bt_att_find_req_by_user_data)","description":"bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.\n\nThe lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.\n\nThe dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.\n\nThe fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-11-16 22:18:27","updated_at":"2026-11-16 22:18:27"},"problem_types":["CWE-476","CWE-476 memory-safety"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9vrw-g886-pqrf","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9vrw-g886-pqrf","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c8e360006acbdffb316b0061f25f230f7ace287c","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c8e360006acbdffb316b0061f25f230f7ace287c","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93672","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93672","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 3.0.0 4.3.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"bt_att_find_req_by_user_data"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.3.2","status":"affected","version":"3.0.0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.\n\nThe lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.\n\nThe dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.\n\nThe fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-476","description":"memory-safety","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-16T21:19:23.997Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c8e360006acbdffb316b0061f25f230f7ace287c"},{"name":"GHSA-9vrw-g886-pqrf","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9vrw-g886-pqrf"}],"title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Bluetooth host ATT request lookup (bt_att_find_req_by_user_data)","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-93672","datePublished":"2026-11-16T21:19:23.997Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-18T13:48:59.901Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-16T21:19:23.997Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-16 22:18:27","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-16 22:18:27","problem_types":["CWE-476","CWE-476 memory-safety"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.6,"impactScore":3.6}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93672","Ordinal":"1","Title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Bluetooth host ATT request looku","CVE":"CVE-2026-93672","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"93672","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.\n\nThe lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.\n\nThe dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.\n\nThe fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.","Type":"Description","Title":"NULL pointer dereference in the Bluetooth host ATT request looku"}]}}}