In MISP, the __statisticsOrgs method in UsersController.php used the organization name directly as a file-system path component when checking for the existence of an organization logo image. The original code called file_exists() with a path constructed as APP . 'webroot' . DS . 'img' . DS . 'orgs' . DS . $k . '.png', where $k is the organization name. Because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) no longer exists in current MISP deployments (org logos were relocated to files/img/orgs), the check was functionally dead and never triggered. However, the underlying pattern—concatenating an attacker-influenced organization name into a file path without sanitization—constitutes a path traversal weakness. An organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., '../../../../etc/passwd') would, if the target directory existed, allow an authenticated user with the ability to create or rename an organization to probe for the existence of arbitrary files on the server.
"}],"value":"In MISP, the __statisticsOrgs method in UsersController.php used the organization name directly as a file-system path component when checking for the existence of an organization logo image. The original code called file_exists() with a path constructed as APP . 'webroot' . DS . 'img' . DS . 'orgs' . DS . $k . '.png', where $k is the organization name. Because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) no longer exists in current MISP deployments (org logos were relocated to files/img/orgs), the check was functionally dead and never triggered. However, the underlying pattern—concatenating an attacker-influenced organization name into a file path without sanitization—constitutes a path traversal weakness. An organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., '../../../../etc/passwd') would, if the target directory existed, allow an authenticated user with the ability to create or rename an organization to probe for the existence of arbitrary files on the server."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-1","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-1 String Manipulation"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":5.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","privilegesRequired":"HIGH","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-22","description":"CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-22T14:44:21.916Z","orgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","shortName":"CIRCL"},"references":[{"name":"Security patch","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a2f7cba6e"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"The fix corrects the logo directory path from the obsolete app/webroot/img/orgs to the current files/img/orgs location, expands the lookup to cover id, name, and uuid fields across png and svg extensions (mirroring the getOrgLogo helper), and adds a security guard: the candidate path is resolved with realpath() and verified via str_starts_with() against the resolved base directory, so any organization name containing traversal sequences (../) that would resolve outside files/img/orgs is rejected.
"}],"value":"The fix corrects the logo directory path from the obsolete app/webroot/img/orgs to the current files/img/orgs location, expands the lookup to cover id, name, and uuid fields across png and svg extensions (mirroring the getOrgLogo helper), and adds a security guard: the candidate path is resolved with realpath() and verified via str_starts_with() against the resolved base directory, so any organization name containing traversal sequences (../) that would resolve outside files/img/orgs is rejected."}],"title":"MISP Path Traversal via Organization Name in Org-Statistics Logo Check","x_gcve":[{"extensions":{"bcp-05-x-01":{"ai_annotations":[{"ai_level":"generated","description":"Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.","gna_source":1,"models":[{"gna_source":1,"identifier":"qwen3.8:27b","name":"qwen3.8:27b","source":"ollama"}],"review_status":"full","scope":"record","tags":["ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated","ai-computer-assisted:classification"]}]},"bcp-05-x-02":{"x_patch2vuln":{"assumptions":["The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47, 50 commits after fix); the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata, so 'less_than 2.5.47' is an approximation and may need CNA confirmation.","The vulnerability was latent in deployed instances because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) did not exist; the CVSS reflects the code-level weakness rather than a confirmed active exploit.","PR:H assumes that creating or renaming an organization requires elevated privileges (admin or org-admin); if MISP allows lower-privileged users to set org names, PR could be lower.","CAPEC-1 (String Manipulation) is the closest available pattern; the exact CAPEC for path traversal via a stored string field is not explicitly enumerated in the CAPEC catalog, so this is a best-effort mapping.","The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 4.8); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer."],"capecRationale":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-1","rationale":"The attack pattern involves manipulating a string value (the organization name) to inject path traversal sequences (../) that cause the application to reference files outside the intended directory. CAPEC-1 is the closest match because the core technique is crafting a string input to alter the application's file-path resolution. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 (Leveraging Unintended Functionality) could also apply since the logo-existence check was an unintended side channel, but CAPEC-1 more directly describes the string-manipulation mechanism."}],"commit":"a2f7cba6e74b791e30013f10720dadbc4117d989","confidence":"medium","credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"Jeroen Pinoy"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"iglocska"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Claude Opus 4.8"}],"cvssRationale":"AV:N – MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L – the traversal sequence in an org name is straightforward to construct. AT:N – no special target-side conditions beyond the org name being stored. PR:H – the attacker must have sufficient privileges to create or rename an organization (typically admin or org-admin role). UI:N – no user interaction required; the check fires server-side during statistics rendering. VC:L – the impact is limited to file-existence disclosure (boolean oracle); file contents are not read. VI:N, VA:N – no integrity or availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N – no secondary-system impact. Note: the vulnerability was latent in practice because the referenced directory did not exist, but the code pattern was exploitable if the directory were present or restored.","fixSummary":"The fix corrects the logo directory path from the obsolete app/webroot/img/orgs to the current files/img/orgs location, expands the lookup to cover id, name, and uuid fields across png and svg extensions (mirroring the getOrgLogo helper), and adds a security guard: the candidate path is resolved with realpath() and verified via str_starts_with() against the resolved base directory, so any organization name containing traversal sequences (../) that would resolve outside files/img/orgs is rejected.","generatedAt":"2026-09-22T14:38:57.879793Z","generator":"patch2vuln.py","model":"qwen3.8:27b","modelComparison":{"rankings":[{"agreementScore":9,"assumptionCount":5,"confidence":"medium","model":"qwen3.8:27b","score":5}],"selectedModel":"qwen3.8:27b","selectionMethod":"deterministic-consensus-v1","selectionNotice":"The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."},"patchSha256":"79f69959d0bcac7da9eea5e1dcd7edc108868ea8382a8e477d3c72e749f06a37","patchSummary":"In app/Controller/UsersController.php __statisticsOrgs(): (1) added 'uuid' to the Organisation query fields; (2) replaced the single file_exists() call against APP/webroot/img/orgs/$k.png with a nested loop over fields [id, name, uuid] and extensions [png, svg]; (3) for each candidate, called realpath() on the full path and compared it with str_starts_with() against the realpath of the base directory (APP/files/img/orgs/), setting the logo flag only when the resolved path is confirmed to be inside that directory; (4) added a break 2 to exit both loops once a match is found.","patchTruncated":false,"patches":[{"commit":"a2f7cba6e74b791e30013f10720dadbc4117d989","patchSha256":"79f69959d0bcac7da9eea5e1dcd7edc108868ea8382a8e477d3c72e749f06a37","source":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a2f7cba6e.patch","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a2f7cba6e.patch","subject":"fix: [ui] Point the org-statistics logo flag at the live"}],"source":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a2f7cba6e.patch","subject":"fix: [ui] Point the org-statistics logo flag at the live","tagVersionBoundary":{"commits_after_fix":50,"repository":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP","tag":"v2.5.47","version":"2.5.47","version_type":"semver"},"weaknessRationale":[{"cweId":"CWE-22","rationale":"The organization name (an attacker-influenced string) was concatenated directly into a file-system path for a file_exists() check without any sanitization or directory-confinement validation. The fix explicitly guards against '../' sequences escaping the intended directory, confirming the weakness is path traversal."}]}}},"recordType":"advisory","vulnId":"GCVE-1-2026-20065"}]}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","assignerShortName":"CIRCL","cveId":"CVE-2026-95701","datePublished":"2026-09-22T14:44:21.916Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-22T14:44:19.514Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-22T14:59:46.097Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-22 15:17:28","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-22 16:18:23","problem_types":["CWE-22","CWE-22 CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":5.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"HIGH","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-09-22T14:59:24.647249Z","id":"CVE-2026-95701","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"95701","Ordinal":"1","Title":"MISP Path Traversal via Organization Name in Org-Statistics Logo","CVE":"CVE-2026-95701","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"95701","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In MISP, the __statisticsOrgs method in UsersController.php used the organization name directly as a file-system path component when checking for the existence of an organization logo image. The original code called file_exists() with a path constructed as APP . 'webroot' . DS . 'img' . DS . 'orgs' . DS . $k . '.png', where $k is the organization name. Because the referenced directory (app/webroot/img/orgs) no longer exists in current MISP deployments (org logos were relocated to files/img/orgs), the check was functionally dead and never triggered. However, the underlying pattern—concatenating an attacker-influenced organization name into a file path without sanitization—constitutes a path traversal weakness. An organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., '../../../../etc/passwd') would, if the target directory existed, allow an authenticated user with the ability to create or rename an organization to probe for the existence of arbitrary files on the server.","Type":"Description","Title":"MISP Path Traversal via Organization Name in Org-Statistics Logo"}]}}}