The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.
The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.
Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.
This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
"}],"value":"The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.\n\n\n\nThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\n\n\n\nOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\n\n\n\nThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root."}],"exploits":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"JFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record.
"}],"value":"JFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"LOW","baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"REQUIRED","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-362","description":"CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-287","description":"CWE-287 Improper Authentication","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z","orgId":"48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d","shortName":"JFROG"},"references":[{"name":"GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf","tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf"},{"name":"Reachy Mini","tags":["product"],"url":"https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini"},{"name":"bluetooth_service.py - WriteValue ignores the caller identity in options","tags":["product"],"url":"https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py"},{"name":"CVE-2026-62661 - Bluetooth command handler path traversal (step 3 of the chain)","tags":["related"],"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661"},{"name":"CVE-2026-55419 - unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API (step 1 of the chain)","tags":["related"],"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 1.0.4"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d","assignerShortName":"JFROG","cveId":"CVE-2026-96456","datePublished":"2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-23T09:53:09.797Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-23T13:58:37.766Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-23 11:17:18","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-23 15:17:32","problem_types":["CWE-287","CWE-362","CWE-362 CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')","CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"reefs@jfrog.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"REQUIRED","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW"},"exploitabilityScore":2.1,"impactScore":3.7}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-09-23T13:56:00.359870Z","id":"CVE-2026-96456","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"96456","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by raci","CVE":"CVE-2026-96456","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"96456","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.\n\n\n\nThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\n\n\n\nOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\n\n\n\nThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.","Type":"Description","Title":"Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by raci"}]}}}