{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-23T17:09:45+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-9697","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-9697","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-9697.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-9697","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9697"},"summary":{"title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped requestTls in SOCKS5 ProxyAgent","description":"Impact:\nundici's ProxyAgent silently drops the requestTls option when configured with a SOCKS5 proxy URI (socks5:// or socks://). The target HTTPS connection through the SOCKS5 tunnel falls back to Node's default trust store, ignoring user-configured ca, cert, key, rejectUnauthorized, and servername settings.\n\nApplications that pin to an internal or corporate CA via requestTls.ca will, when their proxy URI is SOCKS5, get the default Mozilla CA bundle as the trust anchor instead. 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If a SOCKS5 proxy with TLS scope restriction is required and an upgrade is not yet possible, route the traffic through an HTTP-proxy ProxyAgent instead, where requestTls is honored correctly.","Type":"Description","Title":"undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropp"}]}}}