{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-11T06:41:13+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-97200","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-97200","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-97200.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97200","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97200"},"summary":{"title":"Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney","description":"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\nhackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"EEF","published_at":"2026-10-26 14:16:42","updated_at":"2026-10-26 16:59:16"},"problem_types":["CWE-409","CWE-770","CWE-409 CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)","CWE-770 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or 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Without it hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2 never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. 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Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.

\n

hackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.

\n

This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.

"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in `hackney_conn` in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. `hackney:request/5` and `hackney:body/1` return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\n`hackney_conn:read_full_body/2` and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With `{auto_decompress, true}` the buffered body is then inflated in one step with `zlib:gunzip/1` or `zlib:inflate/2`, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0."}],"value":"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\nhackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-130","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"

A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory.

"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory."}],"value":"A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory."}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-409","description":"CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-770","description":"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-26T13:49:40.392Z","orgId":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","shortName":"EEF"},"references":[{"name":"hackney 4.9.0 release notes","tags":["vendor-advisory","related"],"url":"https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"},{"name":"EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-97200","tags":["related"],"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-97200.html"},{"name":"OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-97200","tags":["related"],"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-97200"},{"name":"Cap buffered response bodies with max_body_size and bound decompression (benoitc/hackney#980)","tags":["related"],"url":"https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/980"},{"name":"Introducing commit dc41b79 in benoitc/hackney","tags":["related"],"url":"https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/dc41b79339ca0c41e16d3f2dd17172bc2de855d6"},{"name":"Fix commit 493e8bf in benoitc/hackney","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/493e8bf83a391548e5101792276ab3fc428fa76c"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"

Leave auto_decompress disabled (the default). Without it hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2 never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround.

"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"Leave `auto_decompress` disabled (the default). Without it `hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2` never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround."}],"value":"Leave auto_decompress disabled (the default). Without it hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2 never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround."}],"x_proofOfConcept":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"
    \n
  1. Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.
    2. \n
  2. Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers HTTP/1.1 200 OK with Content-Encoding: gzip, a Content-Length matching the stream, Connection: close, and the stream as body.
    3. \n
  3. From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call hackney:request(get, Url, [], <<>>, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body]) against that listener.
    4. \n
  4. Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without auto_decompress, drives the node out of memory.
    5. \n
"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"1. Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\n2. Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` with `Content-Encoding: gzip`, a `Content-Length` matching the stream, `Connection: close`, and the stream as body.\n3. From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call `hackney:request(get, Url, [], <<>>, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body])` against that listener.\n4. Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without `auto_decompress`, drives the node out of memory."}],"value":"* Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.\n* Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers HTTP/1.1 200 OK with Content-Encoding: gzip, a Content-Length matching the stream, Connection: close, and the stream as body.\n* From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call hackney:request(get, Url, [], <<>>, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body]) against that listener.\n* Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without auto_decompress, drives the node out of memory."}],"x_technicalAnalysis":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"

1. Unbounded accumulation. hackney:request/5 with a body, and hackney:body/1 after start_response/1, read the response in src/hackney_conn.erl through read_full_body/2, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.

\n

2. One-step decompression. With {auto_decompress, true} hackney sends Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate. Once the body is complete, maybe_decompress_body/2 dispatches on Content-Encoding to decompress_gzip/1 (zlib:gunzip/1) or decompress_deflate/1 (zlib:inflate/2). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4.

"},{"base64":false,"type":"text/markdown","value":"**1. Unbounded accumulation.** `hackney:request/5` with a body, and `hackney:body/1` after `start_response/1`, read the response in `src/hackney_conn.erl` through `read_full_body/2`, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\n\n**2. One-step decompression.** With `{auto_decompress, true}` hackney sends `Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate`. Once the body is complete, `maybe_decompress_body/2` dispatches on `Content-Encoding` to `decompress_gzip/1` (`zlib:gunzip/1`) or `decompress_deflate/1` (`zlib:inflate/2`). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4."}],"value":"1. Unbounded accumulation. hackney:request/5 with a body, and hackney:body/1 after start_response/1, read the response in src/hackney_conn.erl through read_full_body/2, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.\n\n2. One-step decompression. With {auto_decompress, true} hackney sends Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate. Once the body is complete, maybe_decompress_body/2 dispatches on Content-Encoding to decompress_gzip/1 (zlib:gunzip/1) or decompress_deflate/1 (zlib:inflate/2). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4."}]}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","assignerShortName":"EEF","cveId":"CVE-2026-97200","datePublished":"2026-10-26T13:49:40.392Z","dateReserved":"2026-10-26T05:15:01.465Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-26T15:35:50.487Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-26 14:16:42","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-26 16:59:16","problem_types":["CWE-409","CWE-770","CWE-409 CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)","CWE-770 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-10-26T14:54:57.385457Z","id":"CVE-2026-97200","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"97200","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney","CVE":"CVE-2026-97200","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"97200","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.\n\nhackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.","Type":"Description","Title":"Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney"}]}}}