{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-02T00:11:53+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-97595","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-97595","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-97595.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97595","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97595"},"summary":{"title":"mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames\n\nThe RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon\nand MAC-command frames onto local->rx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and\nschedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt->sdata (and\nskb->dev == sdata->dev) with neither a reference nor any locking:\n\n - the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the\n   mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt\n   the list;\n\n - the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt->sdata directly, and\n   mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -> mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences\n   skb->dev (== sdata->dev). Removing an interface frees its sdata\n   (netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker\n   run is a use-after-free.\n\nReproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command\nframes and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb->dev):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31\n  Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]\n  Call Trace:\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n   process_one_work+0x611/0xe80\n   worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0\n   kthread+0x30c/0x630\n   ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0\n\nFix both lists together:\n\n - add local->rx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq\n   producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush\n   (spin_lock_bh, process context);\n\n - pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with\n   netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /\n   skb->dev even while the interface is being removed;\n\n - dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the\n   workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a\n   later enqueue to drain the rest);\n\n - drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,\n   from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the\n   ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy\n   teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().\n\nAn in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev\nreference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),\nwhich runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has\nbeen closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association\nTX only delays that one interface's unregister (the usual \"waiting for %s\nto become free\"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this\nreason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on\nthe worker's unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().\n\nThe mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped\ninterface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association\nresponse during teardown.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-25 11:17:10","updated_at":"2026-09-25 15:18:00"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97595","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97595","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.3","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.3 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.111 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.53 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.7 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc3 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"97595","cve":"CVE-2026-97595","epss":"0.002700000","percentile":"0.172860000","score_date":"2026-09-27","updated_at":"2026-09-28 00:02:23"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["include/net/cfg802154.h","net/mac802154/ieee802154_i.h","net/mac802154/iface.c","net/mac802154/main.c","net/mac802154/rx.c","net/mac802154/scan.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06","status":"affected","version":"57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099","status":"affected","version":"57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc","status":"affected","version":"57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031","status":"affected","version":"57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["include/net/cfg802154.h","net/mac802154/ieee802154_i.h","net/mac802154/iface.c","net/mac802154/main.c","net/mac802154/rx.c","net/mac802154/scan.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.3"},{"lessThan":"6.3","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.111","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.53","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.7","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc3","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.111","versionStartIncluding":"6.3","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.53","versionStartIncluding":"6.3","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.7","versionStartIncluding":"6.3","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc3","versionStartIncluding":"6.3","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames\n\nThe RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon\nand MAC-command frames onto local->rx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and\nschedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt->sdata (and\nskb->dev == sdata->dev) with neither a reference nor any locking:\n\n - the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the\n   mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt\n   the list;\n\n - the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt->sdata directly, and\n   mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -> mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences\n   skb->dev (== sdata->dev). Removing an interface frees its sdata\n   (netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker\n   run is a use-after-free.\n\nReproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command\nframes and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb->dev):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31\n  Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]\n  Call Trace:\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n   process_one_work+0x611/0xe80\n   worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0\n   kthread+0x30c/0x630\n   ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0\n\nFix both lists together:\n\n - add local->rx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq\n   producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush\n   (spin_lock_bh, process context);\n\n - pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with\n   netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /\n   skb->dev even while the interface is being removed;\n\n - dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the\n   workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a\n   later enqueue to drain the rest);\n\n - drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,\n   from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the\n   ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy\n   teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().\n\nAn in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev\nreference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),\nwhich runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has\nbeen closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association\nTX only delays that one interface's unregister (the usual \"waiting for %s\nto become free\"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this\nreason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on\nthe worker's unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().\n\nThe mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped\ninterface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association\nresponse during teardown."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:A - ieee802154_subif_frame() queues every received IEEE 802.15.4 MAC command frame (and beacons during a scan) onto local->rx_mac_cmd_list/rx_beacon_list from the RX tasklet with no lock, so a sender in radio range supplies the frames that race the mac_wq worker; 802.15.4 is a radio link, so this is adjacent rather than network.\nAC:H - A remote attacker only reaches the bug by making the tasklet's unlocked list_add_tail() collide with the worker's list_del() on another CPU. They control the flood but not the worker's timing, and the window is a few pointer writes. The use-after-free of sdata also needs an interface removal that the remote attacker cannot cause.\nPR:N - __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() hands every parsed frame to each running non-monitor interface, and ieee802154_subif_frame() queues MAC command frames with no association or scan state required; unsecured frames pass mac802154_llsec_decrypt(), so no credentials are needed.\nUI:N - The victim only needs a running 802.15.4 interface, which is its normal operating state; the attacker sends the frames and the kernel queues and processes them without any user action.\nS:U - The corruption stays within the host kernel (mac802154 RX lists, cfg802154_mac_pkt, netdev_priv sdata) and crosses no VM or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - A corrupted rx_mac_cmd_list or rx_beacon_list lets the worker dereference freed cfg802154_mac_pkt entries, their skb and sdata. Reclaimed slab contents are then read as kernel pointers, a use-after-free read that can disclose kernel memory.\nI:H - The worker does list_del(), kfree() and kfree_skb() on stale mac_pkt entries, and mac802154_process_association_req/resp() write through the freed sdata, giving write and double-free primitives on reclaimable slab memory.\nA:H - List corruption or the sdata use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() or mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() causes a kernel oops; the commit's KASAN report shows such a slab-use-after-free."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-25T14:41:28.874Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031"}],"title":"mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-97595","datePublished":"2026-09-25T10:22:11.134Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-24T16:01:01.157Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-25T14:41:28.874Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-25 11:17:10","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-25 15:18:00","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.6,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"97595","Ordinal":"1","Title":"mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames","CVE":"CVE-2026-97595","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"97595","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames\n\nThe RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon\nand MAC-command frames onto local->rx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and\nschedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt->sdata (and\nskb->dev == sdata->dev) with neither a reference nor any locking:\n\n - the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the\n   mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt\n   the list;\n\n - the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt->sdata directly, and\n   mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -> mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences\n   skb->dev (== sdata->dev). Removing an interface frees its sdata\n   (netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker\n   run is a use-after-free.\n\nReproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command\nframes and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb->dev):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31\n  Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]\n  Call Trace:\n   mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n   process_one_work+0x611/0xe80\n   worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0\n   kthread+0x30c/0x630\n   ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0\n\nFix both lists together:\n\n - add local->rx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq\n   producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush\n   (spin_lock_bh, process context);\n\n - pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with\n   netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /\n   skb->dev even while the interface is being removed;\n\n - dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the\n   workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a\n   later enqueue to drain the rest);\n\n - drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,\n   from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the\n   ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy\n   teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().\n\nAn in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev\nreference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),\nwhich runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has\nbeen closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association\nTX only delays that one interface's unregister (the usual \"waiting for %s\nto become free\"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this\nreason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on\nthe worker's unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().\n\nThe mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped\ninterface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association\nresponse during teardown.","Type":"Description","Title":"mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames"}]}}}