{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-29T06:43:31+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-98151","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-98151","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-98151.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-98151","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98151"},"summary":{"title":"bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic\n\nTake the following unprivileged program as an example:\n\n\tr0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...)\t/* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */\n\t...\n\t14: r0 += r1\t\t\t/* r1 is a bounded scalar */\n\t15: r9 = r0\n\nLoading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():\n\n\tverifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out\n\tof sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}\n\tr32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)\n\nWhat happens:\n\n1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new\n   offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.\n\n2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,\n   __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is\n   re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by\n   reg_bounds_sync().\n\n3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via\n   sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current\n   register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be\n   verified directly as a speculative path.\n\n4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():\n   at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original\n   offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two\n   are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15\n   (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and\n   trips the warning.\n\nvar_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two\nways to keep the snapshot consistent:\n\n  1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or\n  2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it\n     only after the snapshot.\n\nThe whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking\nsequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state\nit snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move\n__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative\nsnapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative\npath is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and\nre-derived by reg_bounds_sync().","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-09-25 11:17:46","updated_at":"2026-09-25 11:17:46"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-98151","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98151","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f 21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f 9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f 150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.8","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.8 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.111 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.53 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.7 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3-rc2 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"98151","cve":"CVE-2026-98151","epss":"0.001570000","percentile":"0.041280000","score_date":"2026-09-27","updated_at":"2026-09-28 00:02:24"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["kernel/bpf/verifier.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8","status":"affected","version":"5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6","status":"affected","version":"5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4","status":"affected","version":"5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0","status":"affected","version":"5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["kernel/bpf/verifier.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.8"},{"lessThan":"6.8","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.111","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.53","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.7","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3-rc2","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.111","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.53","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.7","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3-rc2","versionStartIncluding":"6.8","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic\n\nTake the following unprivileged program as an example:\n\n\tr0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...)\t/* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */\n\t...\n\t14: r0 += r1\t\t\t/* r1 is a bounded scalar */\n\t15: r9 = r0\n\nLoading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():\n\n\tverifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out\n\tof sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}\n\tr32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)\n\nWhat happens:\n\n1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new\n   offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.\n\n2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,\n   __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is\n   re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by\n   reg_bounds_sync().\n\n3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via\n   sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current\n   register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be\n   verified directly as a speculative path.\n\n4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():\n   at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original\n   offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two\n   are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15\n   (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and\n   trips the warning.\n\nvar_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two\nways to keep the snapshot consistent:\n\n  1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or\n  2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it\n     only after the snapshot.\n\nThe whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking\nsequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state\nit snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move\n__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative\nsnapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative\npath is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and\nre-derived by reg_bounds_sync()."}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-25T10:36:23.412Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0"}],"title":"bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-98151","datePublished":"2026-09-25T10:36:23.412Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.320Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-25T10:36:23.412Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-25 11:17:46","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-25 11:17:46","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"98151","Ordinal":"1","Title":"bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithme","CVE":"CVE-2026-98151","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"98151","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic\n\nTake the following unprivileged program as an example:\n\n\tr0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...)\t/* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */\n\t...\n\t14: r0 += r1\t\t\t/* r1 is a bounded scalar */\n\t15: r9 = r0\n\nLoading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():\n\n\tverifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out\n\tof sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}\n\tr32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)\n\nWhat happens:\n\n1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new\n   offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.\n\n2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,\n   __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is\n   re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by\n   reg_bounds_sync().\n\n3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via\n   sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current\n   register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be\n   verified directly as a speculative path.\n\n4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():\n   at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original\n   offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two\n   are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15\n   (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and\n   trips the warning.\n\nvar_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two\nways to keep the snapshot consistent:\n\n  1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or\n  2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it\n     only after the snapshot.\n\nThe whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking\nsequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state\nit snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move\n__mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative\nsnapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative\npath is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and\nre-derived by reg_bounds_sync().","Type":"Description","Title":"bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithme"}]}}}