{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-22T17:45:18+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-98643","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-98643","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-98643.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-98643","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98643"},"summary":{"title":"bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops\n\nA sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the\ntcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the\nctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of\nthe request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.\n\n\tSEC(\"sockops\")\n\tint prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)\n\t{\n\t\tswitch (skops->op) {\n\t\tcase BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:\n\t\t\tleak = skops->rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */\n\t\t...\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nFor instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a\nleaked kernel pointer.\n\nGuarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks\nis_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full\nsocket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is\nthe only one open-coded, so it skips the check.\n\nRead rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:\nit is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass\nrtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset\n\n\toffsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)\n\n(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()\nreturns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is\nadded. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset\nare no longer needed.\n\nBefore patch:\n\n\t0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v\n\nAfter patch:\n\n\t0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9\n\t1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50)      ; is_locked_tcp_sock\n\t2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4      ; not a locked full sock -> 0\n\t3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; rtt_min.s[0].v\n\t6: goto pc+2\n\t7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t8: r1 = 0","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-10-18 16:17:17","updated_at":"2026-10-19 10:19:28"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-98643","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98643","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 4.16","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 4.16 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 5.10.271 5.10.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 5.15.222 5.15.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.1.189 6.1.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.6.158 6.6.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.112 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.18.55 6.18.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.9 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["net/core/filter.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03","status":"affected","version":"44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["net/core/filter.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"4.16"},{"lessThan":"4.16","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"5.10.*","status":"unaffected","version":"5.10.271","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"5.15.*","status":"unaffected","version":"5.15.222","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.1.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.1.189","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.6.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.6.158","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.112","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.18.55","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.9","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"5.10.271","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"5.15.222","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.1.189","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.6.158","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.112","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.55","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.9","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3","versionStartIncluding":"4.16","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops\n\nA sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the\ntcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the\nctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of\nthe request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.\n\n\tSEC(\"sockops\")\n\tint prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)\n\t{\n\t\tswitch (skops->op) {\n\t\tcase BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:\n\t\t\tleak = skops->rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */\n\t\t...\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nFor instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a\nleaked kernel pointer.\n\nGuarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks\nis_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full\nsocket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is\nthe only one open-coded, so it skips the check.\n\nRead rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:\nit is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass\nrtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset\n\n\toffsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)\n\n(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()\nreturns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is\nadded. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset\nare no longer needed.\n\nBefore patch:\n\n\t0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v\n\nAfter patch:\n\n\t0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9\n\t1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50)      ; is_locked_tcp_sock\n\t2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4      ; not a locked full sock -> 0\n\t3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; rtt_min.s[0].v\n\t6: goto pc+2\n\t7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t8: r1 = 0"}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-19T09:23:12.946Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03"}],"title":"bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-98643","datePublished":"2026-10-18T15:20:14.561Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.362Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-19T09:23:12.946Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-18 16:17:17","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-19 10:19:28","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"98643","Ordinal":"1","Title":"bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops","CVE":"CVE-2026-98643","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"98643","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops\n\nA sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the\ntcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the\nctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of\nthe request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.\n\n\tSEC(\"sockops\")\n\tint prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)\n\t{\n\t\tswitch (skops->op) {\n\t\tcase BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:\n\t\t\tleak = skops->rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */\n\t\t...\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nFor instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a\nleaked kernel pointer.\n\nGuarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks\nis_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full\nsocket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is\nthe only one open-coded, so it skips the check.\n\nRead rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:\nit is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass\nrtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset\n\n\toffsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)\n\n(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()\nreturns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is\nadded. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset\nare no longer needed.\n\nBefore patch:\n\n\t0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v\n\nAfter patch:\n\n\t0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9\n\t1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50)      ; is_locked_tcp_sock\n\t2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4      ; not a locked full sock -> 0\n\t3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)      ; r1 = skops->sk\n\t5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324)   ; rtt_min.s[0].v\n\t6: goto pc+2\n\t7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t8: r1 = 0","Type":"Description","Title":"bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops"}]}}}