{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-27T03:18:26+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-99042","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-99042","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-99042.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99042","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99042"},"summary":{"title":"io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-10-23 13:17:27","updated_at":"2026-10-24 14:16:53"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"8.4","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"8.4","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","data":{"baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99042","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99042","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411 596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411 aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 7.2","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.2.11 7.2.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["io_uring/net.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5","status":"affected","version":"899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20","status":"affected","version":"899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["io_uring/net.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"7.2"},{"lessThan":"7.2","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.2.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.2.11","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.2.11","versionStartIncluding":"7.2","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3","versionStartIncluding":"7.2","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - An attacker reaches the patched io_connect_bpf_populate() by locally submitting IORING_OP_CONNECT through io_uring_enter(), with sqe->addr2 supplying the malicious 24-byte length. No network packet carries the value creating the mismatch.\nAC:L - Against a CONNECT filter denying an IPv6 port or address, addr2=24 deterministically makes io_connect_bpf_populate() expose zero port/address while tcp_v6_connect() accepts and uses the real fields; no race or uncontrolled condition is involved.\nPR:L - No capability check exists in io_uring_enter(), io_connect_prep(), or io_connect(), and AF_INET6 SOCK_STREAM creation avoids inet6_create()'s CAP_NET_RAW check. An ordinary confined process with access to the filtered ring can trigger the bypass.\nUI:N - The confined process prepares and submits the 24-byte sockaddr itself, and io_connect_prep() copies it during io_uring_enter(); no other user must mount, open, approve, or otherwise act.\nS:C - The false port/address view escapes the io_uring BPF CONNECT sandbox: __io_uring_run_bpf_filters() allows an operation that an inherited or ring-level filter intended to deny, reaching network resources outside that policy scope.\nC:H - After the filter sees :: and port 0, tcp_v6_connect() uses sin6_addr and sin6_port from the same 24 bytes; the confined process can establish a full socket and read responses from IPv6 services the CONNECT filter explicitly made inaccessible.\nI:H - tcp_v6_connect() stores the hidden destination in sk_v6_daddr and inet_dport and establishes the denied socket, enabling arbitrary application data and requests to be sent to IPv6 services and ports prohibited by the sandbox policy.\nA:N - The bug only substitutes zero values in the filter context; move_addr_to_kernel() safely copies 24 bytes and the IPv6 socket layer accepts that size. It introduces no corruption, out-of-bounds access, oops, hang, or resource exhaustion."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-24T14:10:09.161Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20"}],"title":"io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-99042","datePublished":"2026-10-23T12:22:01.804Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.387Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-24T14:10:09.161Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-23 13:17:27","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-24 14:16:53","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":2,"impactScore":5.8}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"99042","Ordinal":"1","Title":"io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockadd","CVE":"CVE-2026-99042","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"99042","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode.","Type":"Description","Title":"io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockadd"}]}}}