{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-22T20:39:58+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-99800","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-99800","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-99800.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99800","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99800"},"summary":{"title":"io_uring: free the task context after a grace period","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: free the task context after a grace period\n\nA task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()\nrunning the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or\nio_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else\nbranch:\n\n    percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1);\n    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel)))\n            wake_up(&tctx->wait);\n    put_task_struct(tctx->task);\n\nThe first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),\nand on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for\nthe remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed\nalong with the task_struct. It used to work out because\nio_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds\nacross io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.\n\nFree the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in\nio_put_task() before the count is dropped.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2026-11-20 08:18:37","updated_at":"2026-11-22 11:17:10"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99800","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99800","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82 953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82 9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.19","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.19 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.3.2 7.3.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 7.4-rc1 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"99800","cve":"CVE-2026-99800","epss":"0.002740000","percentile":"0.200700000","score_date":"2026-11-21","updated_at":"2026-11-22 00:14:17"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["include/linux/io_uring_types.h","io_uring/io_uring.c","io_uring/tctx.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e","status":"affected","version":"5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15","status":"affected","version":"5623eb1ed035f01dfa620366a82b667545b10c82","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["include/linux/io_uring_types.h","io_uring/io_uring.c","io_uring/tctx.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.19"},{"lessThan":"6.19","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"7.3.*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.3.2","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"7.4-rc1","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.3.2","versionStartIncluding":"6.19","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"7.4-rc1","versionStartIncluding":"6.19","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: free the task context after a grace period\n\nA task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()\nrunning the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or\nio_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else\nbranch:\n\n    percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1);\n    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel)))\n            wake_up(&tctx->wait);\n    put_task_struct(tctx->task);\n\nThe first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),\nand on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for\nthe remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed\nalong with the task_struct. It used to work out because\nio_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds\nacross io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.\n\nFree the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in\nio_put_task() before the count is dropped."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:L - io_put_task() is reached from io_do_iopoll() via io_uring_enter(), or from io_ring_exit_work() after close() of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring, and the owner frees the tctx in io_uring_free_tctx() from execve()->begin_new_exec()->io_uring_task_cancel(). Nothing in that race is a field parsed from a remote protocol message.\nAC:L - The same user drives both sides: execve() makes io_uring_cancel_generic() call io_uring_free_tctx() once percpu_counter_sub() zeroes tctx->inflight, while that user's io_uring_enter() iopoll or the iou_wq exit worker is still in io_put_task(). io_uring_del_tctx_node() takes tctx_lock, so the uring_lock held across the put no longer blocks the free, and the race can be retried.\nPR:L - io_uring_setup() calls io_uring_allowed(), which succeeds for any task when sysctl_io_uring_disabled is 0, the static default. IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN and the execve() path through begin_new_exec() do not check CAP_SYS_ADMIN or any other capability.\nUI:N - The attacker itself calls io_uring_setup(), io_uring_enter() or close(), and execve() on its own tasks. No other user has to open a file, mount an image, or accept a prompt.\nS:U - The freed object is the caller's own kernel io_uring_task. The resulting memory corruption escalates that local user inside the same kernel and does not cross a KVM guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - io_uring_free_tctx() kfree's the tctx while io_put_task() still executes atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel), wake_up(&tctx->wait), and put_task_struct(tctx->task). Reclaiming that slab supplies the task pointer, and put_task_struct() then reads task->usage and, if it hits zero, the rest of the object in __put_task_struct().\nI:H - wake_up(&tctx->wait) locks and walks the wait_queue_head embedded in the freed io_uring_task, calling waiter->func if the reclaimed list is non-empty, and put_task_struct() does refcount_dec_and_test() on whatever pointer now sits in tctx->task, invoking __put_task_struct() when the count hits zero.\nA:H - io_put_task() still takes the spinlock in tctx->wait and dereferences tctx->task after io_uring_free_tctx() has returned the slab, so a poisoned or reused io_uring_task oopses or panics the kernel."}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-22T11:10:13.035Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/953174dcb862a7a364efdb65e178dcd3aea5562e"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f5315d3f4368590c9fe06d4313b7247470bcf15"}],"title":"io_uring: free the task context after a grace period","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2026-99800","datePublished":"2026-11-20T07:02:22.819Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.435Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-22T11:10:13.035Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-20 08:18:37","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-22 11:17:10","problem_types":[],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":7.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"99800","Ordinal":"1","Title":"io_uring: free the task context after a grace period","CVE":"CVE-2026-99800","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"99800","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: free the task context after a grace period\n\nA task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()\nrunning the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or\nio_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else\nbranch:\n\n    percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1);\n    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel)))\n            wake_up(&tctx->wait);\n    put_task_struct(tctx->task);\n\nThe first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),\nand on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for\nthe remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed\nalong with the task_struct. It used to work out because\nio_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds\nacross io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.\n\nFree the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in\nio_put_task() before the count is dropped.","Type":"Description","Title":"io_uring: free the task context after a grace period"}]}}}