QID 15142

Date Published: 2023-07-03

QID 15142: ISC BIND Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerability (CVE-2023-2911)

ISC BIND (Berkley Internet Domain Name) is an implementation of DNS protocols.

If the recursive-clients quota is reached on a BIND 9 resolver configured with both stale-answer-enable yes, and stale-answer-client-timeout 0, a sequence of serve-stale-related lookups could cause named to loop and terminate unexpectedly due to a stack overflow.

Affected versions:
BIND from 9.16.33 prior to 9.16.42
BIND from 9.18.7 prior to 9.18.16

Affected BIND Supported Preview Edition
Bind from 9.16.33-S1 prior to 9.16.42-S1
Bind form 9.18.11-S1 prior to 9.18.16-S1

Patched Versions:
9.16.42
9.18.16
9.16.42-S1

9.18.16-S1

QID Detection Logic:
This unauthenticated check detects vulnerable systems by fetching the version information from the BIND service.

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an attacker to cause named to terminate unexpectedly by sending specific queries to the resolver.

  • CVSS V3 rated as High - 7.5 severity.
  • CVSS V2 rated as Medium - 5 severity.
    • Solution
    Customers are advised to upgrade to the patched version latest release of ISC BIND.
    Workaround:
    Setting stale-answer-client-timeout to off or to a non-zero value prevents the issue.
    Vendor References

    CVEs related to QID 15142

    CVE-2023-2911 |
    Software Advisories
    Advisory ID Software Component Link
    CVE-2023-2911 URL Logo kb.isc.org/v1/docs/cve-2023-2911
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