QID 316965

Date Published: 2021-05-05

QID 316965: Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Software Command Injection Vulnerability(cisco-sa-asa-ftd-cmd-inj-SELprvG)

A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software
could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary
commands on the underlying operating system (OS) of an affected device.

Affected Products
Cisco FTD Software releases :
Prior to 6.6.4
From 6.7.0 Prior to 6.7.0.2
Note: This vulnerability does not affect Cisco FTD Software deployments that are in native mode.
Only affects one's in multi-instance (MI) mode. Potential check as cannot confirm the mode on the target.

QID detection logic:
The QID checks for Cisco FTD version retrieved via Unix Auth using "show version" command.

A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands on the underlying OS with root privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have valid administrator-level credentials.

  • CVSS V3 rated as High - 6.7 severity.
  • CVSS V2 rated as High - 7.2 severity.
    • Solution

    Customers are advised to refer to cisco-sa-asa-ftd-cmd-inj-SELprvG for more information.

    Vendor References

    CVEs related to QID 316965

    CVE-2021-1476 |
    Software Advisories
    Advisory ID Software Component Link
    cisco-sa-asa-ftd-cmd-inj-SELprvG URL Logo tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asa-ftd-cmd-inj-SELprvG
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