QID 317279

Date Published: 2022-11-24

QID 317279: Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software Dynamic Access Policies Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerability (cisco-sa-asa-ftd-dap-dos-GhYZBxDU)

A vulnerability in dynamic access policies (DAP) functionality of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.

Affected Products
This vulnerability affects Cisco products if they are running a vulnerable release of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software:

QID Detection Logic (Authenticated):
This QID will check the version retrieved via Unix Auth using "show version" command.
Note: This QID only works in diagnostic console mode. Workaround commands need to be run in expert mode. Hence QID is kept as practice.

A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition.

  • CVSS V3 rated as High - 7.5 severity.
  • CVSS V2 rated as High - 7.8 severity.
    • Solution

    Customers are advised to refer to cisco-sa-ssl-client-dos-cCrQPkA for more information.

    Vendor References

    CVEs related to QID 317279

    CVE-2022-20947 |
    Software Advisories
    Advisory ID Software Component Link
    cisco-sa-asa-ftd-dap-dos-GhYZBxDU URL Logo tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asa-ftd-dap-dos-GhYZBxDU
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