QID 317309

Date Published: 2023-03-27

QID 317309: Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) XE Software IOx Application Hosting Environment Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk)

A vulnerability in the Cisco IOx application hosting subsystem of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate privileges to root on an affected device.

Affected Products:
Cisco products if they are running a vulnerable release of Cisco IOS XE Software, they have the Cisco IOx application hosting feature configured, and the hosted application is running.

QID Detection Logic (Authenticated):
The check matches Cisco IOS XE version retrieved via Unix Auth using "show version" command.
QID Detection Logic (Unauthenticated):
The check matches Cisco IOS XE version retrieved via SNMP or TCP/IP Fingerprint or NTP or Telnet.

A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root privileges.

  • CVSS V3 rated as High - 7.8 severity.
  • CVSS V2 rated as Medium - 3.6 severity.
    • Solution

    Customers are advised to refer to cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk for more information.

    Vendor References

    CVEs related to QID 317309

    CVE-2023-20065 |
    Software Advisories
    Advisory ID Software Component Link
    cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk URL Logo sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk
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