QID 355390

the curl advisory describes this issue as follows: curl supports communicating using the telnet protocol and as a part of this it offers users to pass on user name and "telnet options" for the server negotiation. due to lack of proper input scrubbing and without it being the documented functionality, curl would pass on user name and telnet options to the server as provided.
This could allow users to pass in carefully crafted content that pass on content or do option negotiation without the application intending to do so.
In particular if an application for example allows users to provide the data or parts of the data. (
( CVE-2023-27533) the curl advisory describes this issue as follows: curl supports sftp transfers.
Curls sftp implementation offers a special feature in the path component of urls: a tilde (~) character as the first path element in the path to denotes a path relative to the users home directory.
This is supported because of wording in the once proposed to-become rfc draft that was to dictate how sftp urls work. due to a bug, the handling of the tilde in sftp path did however not only replace it when it is used stand-alone as the first path element but also wrongly when used as a mere prefix in the first element. using a path like /~2/foo when accessing a server using the user dan (with home directory /home/dan) would then quite surprisingly access the file /home/dan2/foo. this can be taken advantage of to circumvent filtering or worse. (
However, this gss delegation setting was left out from the configuration match checks, making them match too easily, affecting krb5/kerberos/negotiate/gssapi transfers. (
( CVE-2023-27538)

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a securitybreach or could affect integrity, availability, and confidentiality.