Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-71272 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | TuranSec |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-08-05 13:24:51 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-08-05 16:17:06 UTC |
| Description | Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v3.1 8.5 HIGH from 309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Problem Types: CWE-367 | CWE-367 CWE-367
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c | Secondary | 8.5 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | CNA | DECLARED | 8.5 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N |
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
Attack Vector
NetworkAttack Complexity
LowPrivileges Required
LowUser Interaction
NoneScope
ChangedConfidentiality
HighIntegrity
LowAvailability
NoneCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/usememos/memos | 309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c | github.com | |
| github.com/usememos/memos/blob/main/internal/webhook/webhook.go | 309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Alibek Baxtiyorov (en)
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.